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 Abstract 
This dissertation studies patterns of dispersion in density forecasts as 
reported in surveys of professional forecasters. We pay special attention to the 
role of uncertainty in explaining dispersion in professional forecasters’ density 
forecasts of real output growth and inflation. We also consider the relationship 
between survey design and forecaster behavior. The last chapter describes future 
research exploring the characteristics of forecaster expectations using probability 
integral transforms. 
As a starting point, chapter one gives a summary of the literature that tries 
to answer, using data from survey of forecasters, the following three key questions: 
Why do forecasters disagree? What do density forecasts reveal in addition to point 
forecasts? Does disagreement serve as a good proxy for forecaster uncertainty? 
This chapter provides an overview of the studies and briefly discusses how this 
dissertation can make contributions to the literature. 
Chapter two explores the role of uncertainty in explaining dispersion in 
professional forecasters’ density forecasts of real output growth and inflation. We 
consider three separate notions of uncertainty: general macroeconomic uncertainty 
(the fact that macroeconomic variables are easier to forecast at some time than 
others), policy uncertainty, and forecaster uncertainty. The main finding is that 
dispersion in individual density forecasts is related to overall macroeconomic 
uncertainty and policy uncertainty, while forecaster uncertainty (which we define 
as the average in the uncertainty expressed by individual forecasters) appears to 
have little role in forecast dispersion.  
Chapter three examines the relationship between survey design and 
forecasters’ behavior by exploiting changes to the probability bins provided to 
 forecasters at the solicitation of density forecasts. We consider three important 
surveys, namely Survey of Professional Forecasters by the Philadelphia Fed (US-
SPF), Survey of Professional Forecasters by the European Central Bank (ECB-
SPF), and Survey of External Forecasters by Bank of England (SEF). While the 
adjustment of forecast bins can reasonably arise from the fluctuation of underlying 
macroeconomic variable, there are also cases where the modification is neutral to 
the economic environment. Our analysis examines how disagreement and 
forecaster uncertainty respond to these two different categories of survey changes. 
The results suggest that disagreement only responds to changes caused by real 
economy. Uncertainty responds to both and the effect is more persistent. These 
empirical facts highlight the importance of behavioral perspective when 
inferences are drawn from professional forecasts. 
I summarize our conclusion in Chapter four, and describe future research 
plan exploring the features of forecaster uncertainty using probability integral 
transforms (“z-statistics”), a commonly-used test for density forecast optimality. 
We focus on the shape of the distribution of z-statistics, which is informative 
about the confidence level as well as bias (optimism or pessimism) of forecasters. 
There is evidence of significant hysteresis and that survey scheme greatly affects 
the performance of density forecasts. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Survey 
Expectations play an important role in the management of an economy and 
more and more central banks are building their own dataset of economic 
predictions based on surveys of individuals, including professional forecasters. 
These datasets allow researchers and policy makers to examine the expectation 
formation process of individuals and thus can help improve economic modelling 
as well as formulate more robust and effective monetary policies. In addition to 
point forecasts, many such surveys now collect density forecasts. Density 
forecasts potentially depict a more complete picture of expectations and thus 
provide a wider framework to study how individuals form their economic 
predictions. These well-developed surveys allow both economic analysts and 
policy makers to better understand the expectation formation process of 
individuals in the economy. However, there are many features highlighted in the 
datasets that are quite different from assumptions made in many classical 
economic models and cultivate a growing literature focusing on the features as 
well as determinants of these features. 
Why do forecasters disagree? 
Surveys of macroeconomic forecasts show that forecasters generally 
disagree with each other. Pervasive evidence of forecast dispersion is found in 
both point and density forecasts, even among a group of economic agents that 
should be reasonably homogeneous in terms of ability and motivation. This fact 
indicates that expectations are actually heterogeneous, contradictory to the widely 
accepted basic assumption of “rational expectations”, and emphasizes the 
necessity of taking heterogeneous expectations into account when constructing 
macroeconomic models for policy and forecasting. Therefore, a large number of 
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studies explore the determents of disagreement and explanations considering 
different types of heterogeneity among forecasters have been proposed to answer 
this question. The first one is heterogeneity in terms of information set. This 
relates to information rigidity literature including noisy information model (Sims, 
2002) where the dispersion stems from uncertain news, and sticky information 
model proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), where forecasters only occasionally 
update their information at different rate due to the cost in updating news. Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko (2012) provide empirical evidence to support the sticky 
information model. Another form of heterogeneity is linked to the models used by 
the forecasters. Branch (2004,2007) finds that forecasters dynamically switch 
between a set of costly alternative prediction models in each period. In addition to 
model uncertainty, Patton and Timmermann (2010) and Lahiri and Sheng (2010) 
show that difference in priors is an important determinant of dispersion, especially 
at longer horizons. Manzan (2011) extends the literature by illustrating that 
heterogeneity in interpretation of news as well could explain the source of 
dispersion. Last but not least, Capistran and Timmermann (2009) examine the role 
of loss function and find that heterogeneity in the asymmetric loss function could 
lead to dispersion.  
Capistran and Ramos-Francia (2010) assess the relationship between 
dispersion and monetary policy using a panel dataset of multiple countries. They 
find that the dispersion of long-run inflation expectations is smaller in countries 
with targeting regimes. A multi-national study of Dovern, Fritsche and Slacalek 
(2012) find that dispersion of GDP growth is more strongly affected by real 
factors and dispersion of price reacts to institutional setting of monetary policy, in 
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particular, central bank independence. These findings indicate that the degree of 
dispersion may be affected by monetary policy and real economic factors.   
What do density forecasts reveal in addition to point forecasts? 
Density forecasts are nowadays commonly included in professional 
forecaster surveys to depict a more complete picture of the forecast uncertainty. 
Studies of density forecasts have up to now largely focused on whether density 
forecasts are optimal. One exception is Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2009), 
who examines whether the central location of density forecasts matches the point 
forecasts.  
One difficulty that economic researchers face is the inability to measure 
forecaster uncertainty. Since density forecasts appear to provide a direct self-
represented measure of forecaster uncertainty, a new and rapidly growing strand 
of literature studies the second moment of density forecasts and focuses on the 
features of forecaster uncertainty. Boero, Smith and Wallis (2015) find that there 
is great heterogeneity and persistence in forecaster uncertainty. 
Does disagreement serve as a good proxy for uncertainty? 
Declining dispersion from long to short horizons suggests a link between 
dispersion and uncertainty. Dispersion has been widely taken as a substitute for 
uncertainty, which has always been the focus of policy makers and difficult to 
quantitatively measure. However, this approach is subject to a long-lasting debate 
in the literature. On one side, Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) and Giordani and 
Soderlind (2003) find that the dispersion and uncertainty are highly correlated so 
that dispersion can serve as a reasonable proxy for uncertainty. On the other side, 
Rich and Tracy (2008) argue that there is little evidence supporting this 
relationship. Furthermore, Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008, 2015) examine this 
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topic using the Bank of England Survey of External Forecasters and argue that 
dispersion is not a good proxy for uncertainty, as least during stable periods. 
Lahiri and Sheng (2010) give opposite argument that dispersion is a reliable 
measure for uncertainty in a stable period but less useful as a proxy in periods 
with large volatility. 
In this dissertation, I study these topics using three world-wide surveys, 
namely Survey of Professional Forecasters by the Philadelphia Fed (US-SPF), 
Survey of Professional Forecasters by the European Central Bank (ECB-SPF), and 
Survey of External Forecasters by Bank of England (SEF), to further explore the 
features of density forecasts and underlying determinants of the features.  
Chapter two explores the role of uncertainty in explaining dispersion in 
professional forecasters’ density forecasts of real output growth and inflation. We 
consider three separate notions of uncertainty: general macroeconomic uncertainty 
(the fact that macroeconomic variables are easier to forecast at some time than 
others), policy uncertainty, and forecaster uncertainty. We find that dispersion in 
individual density forecasts is related to overall macroeconomic uncertainty and 
policy uncertainty, while forecaster uncertainty (which we define as the average in 
the uncertainty expressed by individual forecasters) appears to have little role in 
explaining forecast dispersion. On one hand, our work contributes to the literature 
by extending the analysis on dispersion from point forecasts to density forecasts. 
Though there is growing literature focusing on density forecast evaluation and 
forecaster uncertainty, very few studies examine the dispersion pattern in density 
forecasts. On the other hand, we exploit various forms of uncertainty to explain 
forecast dispersion, including both subjective and objective measures showing 
different perspective of the economic environment. By doing so, we are able to 
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add new elements to the literature examining determinants of dispersion. 
Furthermore, further analysis on forecaster uncertainty and dispersion in this study 
highlights different features of these two important measures represented in 
density forecasts and helps us better understand the relationship of them. 
Chapter three examines the relationship between survey design and 
forecasters’ behavior by exploiting changes to the probability bins provided to 
forecasters at the solicitation of density forecasts. While the adjustment of forecast 
bins can reasonably arise from the fluctuation of underlying macroeconomic 
variable, there are also cases where the modification is neutral to the economic 
environment. Our analysis examines how disagreement and forecaster uncertainty 
respond to the two different categories of survey changes. The results suggest that 
disagreement only responds to changes caused by real economy. Uncertainty 
responds to both and the effect is more persistent. This chapter contributes to the 
literature on characteristics of forecaster uncertainty from the behavioral 
perspective. More importantly, it provides a note of caution on the survey design: 
as the survey design itself could affect the forecasters’ behavior, we should pay 
special attention on the form of the survey questions and be very cautious when 
making any modifications. 
Chapter four concludes, and describes a useful avenue for future research. 
We propose to further investigate the features of forecaster uncertainty using 
probability integral transforms (“z-statistics”), a commonly-used test for density 
forecast optimality. We focus on the shape of the distribution of z-statistics, which 
is informative about the confidence level as well as bias (optimism or pessimism) 
of forecasters. There is evidence of significant hysteresis and that survey scheme 
greatly affects the performance of density forecasts. Such a study would provide a 
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new application of the traditional density forecast evaluation method and add to 
the literature an innovative prospective on analyzing the determinants of key 
features of density forecasts. 
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Chapter 2 The Role of Macroeconomic, Policy, and Forecaster Uncertainty in 
Forecast Dispersion1 
2.1 Introduction 
Surveys of macroeconomic forecasts show that forecasters generally 
disagree with each other. Point forecasts are typically dispersed, with patterns like 
those shown in the left panel of Figure 2.1. This panel displays point forecasts for 
year 1996 PGDP inflation made by forecasters surveyed by the Philadelphia Fed 
in their quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) over the period 
1995Q1 to 1996Q4, i.e., at horizons 7 down to 0 quarters. The point forecasts are 
dispersed at long horizons, with dispersion falling as the forecaster approaches full 
realization of the forecast event. Some persistence in the forecasts can also be 
observed, with relatively optimistic and pessimistic forecasts tending to remain so. 
Similar patterns have been observed in many other similar datasets, including 
surveys carried out by Consensus Economics and the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Explanations put forward for these and other patterns in dispersion include 
the use of different information sets by forecasters, perhaps due to different 
degrees of information rigidities among them (Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers 2003), 
different interpretation of information by forecasters (Kandel and Zilberfarb 1999; 
Manzan 2011), different loss functions among forecasters (Capistran and 
Timmermann 2009), and different priors held by forecasters regarding the 
unconditional distribution of the variables being forecasted (Patton and 
Timmermann 2010).  
                                                
 
 
1 Coauthored with Anthony Tay. 
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Several surveys of macroeconomic forecasts also elicit density forecasts 
and these too tend to be dispersed, as can be seen from the figures in the right 
column of Figure 2.1. These figures show the median, central 90% interval, and a 
skewness measure of individual density forecasts for the same variable as the 
point forecast in the left panel. Density forecasts, of course, offer us the potential 
of observing a forecaster’s expectations in a more complete form. The spread of a 
density forecast would seem a reasonable direct measure of the level of 
uncertainty perceived by the forecaster. Asymmetries in the density forecasts, for 
a given level of uncertainty, may indicate some degree of optimism or pessimism. 
Dispersion patterns in the SPF density forecasts have been studied by Lahiri and 
Liu (2006) who explore in particular the determinants of inflation forecast 
uncertainty. Dispersion patterns in the density forecasts elicited via the Bank of 
England’s Survey of External Forecasters have been documented in Boero, Smith, 
and Wallis (2008, 2015).  
Pervasive evidence of (point and density) forecast dispersion, even among 
a group of economic agents who should be reasonably homogeneous in terms of 
ability and motivation, suggest that expectations may in general be heterogeneous. 
If this is so, then heterogeneous expectations should be taken into account when 
constructing macroeconomic models for policy and forecasting. But why are 
expectations dispersed, and does uncertainty play any role? Declining dispersion 
from long to short horizons suggests a link between dispersion and uncertainty, 
though the nature of this link is not at all clear. According to forecasting theory, 
this pattern is somewhat perplexing. At long horizons, point forecasts should be 
close to the unconditional mean if forecasters have a mean squared error loss 
function. Dispersion at longer horizons could therefore imply that different 
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forecasters have various loss functions (Capistran and Timmermann 2009). Or it 
might be simply that different forecasters have different priors regarding the 
unconditional distribution of the variables being forecast (Patton and 
Timmermann 2010). If information is interpreted differently or absorbed at 
different rates, then we might expect greater dispersion at shorter horizons.  
In this paper, we explore the role of uncertainty in explaining forecast 
dispersion, making a distinction between forecaster uncertainty and general 
uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment. While we might expect the two to 
be related, they are not necessarily identical. It is generally accepted that there is 
time-variation in the volatility of macroeconomic variables, so that these variables 
are easier to predict in some periods, and harder to do so during others. However, 
it is not difficult to imagine an overconfident forecaster who always issues very 
narrow density forecasts. As part of the broader concept of uncertainty in the 
macroeconomic environment, one might also include policy uncertainty, which 
again might be expected to be related to, but not identical to forecaster uncertainty 
or variations in predictability. We use density forecasts to construct a measure of 
forecaster uncertainty, and take advantage of recently developed indices of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, which focus on whether the economy has become 
more or less predictable (Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng 2015), and of policy 
uncertainty, that rely on the prevalence of ‘uncertainty’ keywords in news articles 
(Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016). We correlate our measures of dispersion in 
density forecasts with these direct measures of uncertainty. 
Our work differs from much of the forecast dispersion literature in that we 
explore dispersion of density forecasts, and not point forecasts. While there are 
several papers that have documented dispersion of density forecasts (Boero, Smith 
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and Wallis, 2008), the literature has in general focused on explaining the behavior 
of individual uncertainty (Lahiri and Liu 2006). Our interest is in characterizing 
the behavior of dispersion in the location, spread, and skewness of individual 
density forecasts, using the overall levels of these as well as indices of 
macroeconomic and policy uncertainty as explanatory variables. Whereas most 
studies focus on inflation expectations, we also study output growth expectations; 
it turns out that there are some interesting differences in the behavior of the two. 
This paper is also closely related to research that is aimed at establishing whether 
or not point forecast dispersion is a good proxy for forecaster uncertainty 
(Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Giordani and Soderlind, 2003; Rich and Tracy, 
2010; Boero, Smith and Wallis, 2008, 2015), which boils down to asking if 
dispersion can explain individual uncertainty (the general consensus appears to be, 
mostly, ‘no’.) The objective of our exercise, on the other hand, is to see if various 
forms of uncertainty can explain forecast dispersion, which we take to be a 
reflection of heterogeneity in expectations. We find, in general, that dispersion is 
correlated to macroeconomic uncertainty, less so with policy uncertainty, and not 
correlated with forecaster uncertainty.  
In the next section, we describe the SPF survey dataset briefly, focusing on 
the density forecasts and the percentile-based summary statistics that we use to 
characterize them. We also describe the patterns of dispersion in these summary 
statistics. We take a closer look at forecaster uncertainty in Section 2.3, and its 
relationship to the macroeconomic uncertainty and policy uncertainty indices. Our 
main results regarding dispersion are reported in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 
concludes. 
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2.2 Characteristics and Dispersion of Density Forecasts 
2.2.1 Data 
Our expectations data are forecasts elicited from professional forecasters 
by the Philadelphia Fed through their Survey of Professional Forecasters. Every 
quarter the Philadelphia Fed surveys a panel of professional forecasters for their 
expectations regarding a range of macroeconomic variables at various forecast 
horizons. The survey is sent out after the release of advanced estimates for the 
variables for the previous quarter. The variables for which point forecasts are 
collected include quarterly and annual frequency real and nominal GDP, 
unemployment, 3-month treasury bill and 10-year treasury bond rates, price 
indices (GDP price index, CPI and PCE indices), among others. Besides point 
forecasts, the surveys also elicit density forecasts for growth in the annual 
averages of real GDP, the GDP price index (PGDP), core CPI and core PCE, and 
the civilian unemployment rate. The density forecasts take the form of histograms; 
forecasters are given a set of intervals and asked to provide for each interval an 
estimate of the probability with which the variable’s realization is expected to 
appear in that interval. Figure 2.2 displays an individual forecaster’s density 
forecasts from the 2009Q1 and 2010Q1 surveys, for growth in the annual-average 
of real GDP for the year 2010. 
Our focus in this paper is on the density forecasts for the annual average of 
real GDP growth and PGDP inflation, since density forecasts for the other 
variables are recent additions to the survey (2007Q1 for CPI and PCE inflation, 
2009Q2 for unemployment). Density forecasts are elicited for the annual 
outcomes for the current year and the following year, so for each target year we 
have forecasts made at horizons of 0h =  to 7h =  quarters. The Q1 surveys 
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contain forecasts 3- and 7-quarters ahead (corresponding to the current year and 
following year forecasts respectively), the Q2 surveys contain forecasts at 2- and 
6-quarter horizons, the Q3 survey contains forecasts 1- and 5-quarters ahead, and 
the Q4 survey contains forecasts at 0- and 4-quarter horizons. From 2009Q2 
onwards, the survey began requesting, for certain variables, density forecasts for 
the current and next three years, so in more recent surveys we have forecasts up to 
15 quarters ahead. However, for this study we only consider forecasts made 0 to 7 
quarters ahead.  
We restrict our analysis to forecasts starting with the 1992Q1 survey, even 
though point and density forecasts for output and inflation are available all the 
way back to the first survey in 1968Q4. There are several reasons for using the 
post-1992Q1 sample period. First, there were several definition changes to the 
variables forecasted prior to the 1992Q1 survey (for output, from nominal GNP to 
real GNP to real GDP). In some years prior to 1992Q1 the survey asked forecasts 
for the previous and current year, instead of the current and following year. Since 
1992Q1 the definitions have been stable. Second, in the surveys in the 1980s, the 
interval widths given for density forecasts were switched from one percentage 
point intervals to two percentage point intervals, leading to much cruder density 
forecasts. In addition to this, the intervals provided in some of the earlier surveys 
were sometimes completely misaligned with the expectations of the forecasters, 
resulting in density forecasts with probabilities concentrated in the first or last 
open-ended bins. In contrast, the sample period that we use is much cleaner in 
terms of variable and forecast definitions, and have fewer instances of ‘misaligned’ 
bins, and only very few instances where the percentile-based summary statistics 
that we use cannot be computed. Our sample period ends with the 2016Q4 survey. 
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Finally, we limit our sample to include only density forecasts where the 
median of a density forecast matches the forecaster’s point forecast. As noted 
earlier, one possible reason for disagreement among forecasters is simply that they 
have different loss functions. By matching point and density forecasts, we control 
for major differences in loss function by limiting ourselves to forecasters with 
symmetric loss functions, where the point forecasts should (more or less) coincide 
with the mean or median of the density forecast. The matching method we use is 
based on the bounds implied by the density forecasts (Engelberg, Manski and 
Williams 2009). The first step to constructing the matched sample is to calculate 
the lower and upper bounds of both subjective median and mean. The interval in 
which the median lies can be obtained from the probabilistic responses directly. 
To calculate lower and upper bounds on the subjective mean, we assume that each 
bin’s probability mass is placed at the bin’s lower and upper endpoint respectively. 
The results are then generated by averaging the lower and upper endpoints 
weighted by the probabilities. If the point forecast is located within any of the two 
sets of bounds, the density forecast is counted as ‘matched’ to the point forecast. 
The final matched sample includes 5784 observations for PGDP and 6260 
observations for RGDP which means that we retain roughly 30 forecasters in each 
quarter. The matching takes care of another issue in the sample, that is the 
presence of outliers and unusual observations that appear to be errors of some sort, 
or at least difficult to otherwise justify. These outliers are removed via the 
matching process. Figure 2.3 shows the scatter plots of the median of density 
forecasts and point forecasts in both the full and the matched samples. 
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics for Density Forecasts 
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We summarize each density forecast using its median, central 90% range, 
and a Bowley-type skewness statistic to describe the location, spread, and shape 
features of the density forecast respectively. The Bowley statistic that we use to 
measure skewness in the density forecasts is  
95 50 50 5
95 5
( ) ( )x x x xS
x x
- - -
=
-
 
where xa  represents the a -th percentile of the density forecast. Bowley skewness 
statistics are usually calculated using the median and the interquartile range, but 
here we use instead the median 50x , and the central 90% range 95 5x x- . The 
interquartile version of the Bowley statistic is usually applied to a sample of 
observations, where the 5th and 95th percentiles are often not meaningful unless 
the sample size is large. In our application, we use the Bowley statistic to describe 
a density forecast rather than a sample of data, and using the central 90% range is 
feasible, and preferred, as it covers more of the distribution. Whereas the range 
might be considered a measure of individual uncertainty, the Bowley statistic 
might be interpreted as a direct measure of optimism/pessimism of the forecaster. 
Our main reason for using percentile-based descriptions of the density 
forecasts is that the end bins are open-ended, which complicate the computation of 
moment-based and entropy-based statistics. Using percentile-based descriptions 
avoids the strong assumptions which are needed for moment- and entropy-based 
measures. Of course, the percentile-based statistics that we use also has its 
disadvantages, e.g., it requires interpolation within the bins (we use linear 
interpolation of the cumulative probabilities, thus assume probabilities to be 
evenly spread within each bin). Furthermore, the 5th (95th) percentiles cannot be 
computed if the probabilities reported for the first or last bins are greater than 5 
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(probabilities are reported out of 100). While our assumption regarding the shape 
of the density forecasts is strong, this is mitigated by the fact that the assumption 
is applied only in the bins in which the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles fall. The 
fact that the 5th and 95th percentiles cannot be computed in some cases is also not 
a major issue for our sample period. Finally, recent papers have considered 
moment- and entropy based statistics (Rich and Tracy 2010, Boero, Smith and 
Wallis 2008, 2015) for some of the issues we examine, so it is interesting to see 
how our results compare with these studies when using different measures.  
 We use  
, ,i t hM , , ,i t hR , and , ,i t hS  
to denote the median, range, and skewness statistics for forecaster i ’s period t  
density forecast of annual GDP growth or annual inflation made h -quarters ahead, 
0,1,...,7h = . The subscript t  is a quarterly date index (1992Q1, 1992Q2, etc.) and 
represents the survey date. The target year is not represented in this notation, and 
must be derived from the survey date t  and the horizon. We use the sample period 
1992 1,..., 2016 4t q q= . 
We are interested in the dispersion in the three density forecast 
characteristics among forecasters. Dispersion measures are calculated as standard 
deviations over the forecasters in each period. We denote our dispersion measures 
as  
, , ,std.dev.( )t h i t hM M
s = , , , ,std.dev.( )t h i t hR R
s = , , , ,std.dev.( )t h i t hS S
s = . 
We will also be referring to the mean levels of the characteristics, which we 
denote as  
, , ,mean( )
m
t h i t hM M= , , , ,mean( )
m
t h i t hR R= , , , ,mean( )
m
t h i t hS S= . 
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In particular, we treat ,
m
t hR , the average of individual uncertainty, as a measure of 
overall forecaster uncertainty. We discuss this variable more in the next section, 
together with measures of macroeconomic and policy uncertainty. The variable 
,
m
t hS  is included as an elaboration of average individual uncertainty, indicating 
asymmetries in relative upside vs downside risks. The variable ,
m
t hM  is included as 
there may be a relationship between the level of inflation (which should be 
correlated with the expected level of inflation) and inflation uncertainty (Ball 
1992), a relationship which several previous studies have confirmed (Lahiri and 
Liu 2006, Rich and Tracy 2010). We include ,
m
t hM  for our output growth 
regressions as well.  
2.2.3 Dispersion Patterns in Density Forecasts 
Figure 2.4(a) summarizes the behavior of individual PGDP inflation 
density forecasts, and the dispersion of these forecasts. The top row displays the 
average of the median, range, and skewness of the individual density forecasts. 
The bottom row shows the standard deviation of these characteristics of the 
individual forecasts. Each line in each subfigure corresponds to a target year 
(1992 to 2017), all plotted against forecast horizon. The top row shows how, on 
average, the forecasters revise their forecasts each quarter for each target year in 
our sample, and the bottom row shows the disagreements among the forecasters. 
Figure 2.4(b) shows the corresponding figures for RGDP growth.  
The subfigures marked mM  show moderate revisions to the density 
forecast medians on average, except for a sharp drop in the RGDP growth 
forecasts for 2009. The subfigures marked mR  show that average individual 
uncertainty falls as the forecast horizon approaches zero, with the fall accelerating 
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from horizons 3 to 0 quarters. The accelerating fall should be due in large part to 
the fact that fewer quarters are being forecasted in these horizons (these are 
forecasts of annual growth for the year in which the quarterly surveys are taken). 
We might also expect average uncertainty to fall because more information is 
(presumably) being incorporated into the forecasts each quarter. This seems more 
the case for RGDP growth than for PGDP inflation. The subfigure for forecaster 
uncertainty mR  in PGDP inflation also shows something that might be of concern. 
There is a systematic drop in average range from the 2014Q1 surveys onwards. 
This corresponds to a change in bin definitions for PGDP inflation to match those 
of CPI and core PCE, with the overall range reduced substantially (from “ 0<  ”,…, 
“ 8>  ”, to “ 0<  ”, …, “ 4> ”). This is worrying because it might indicate a 
framing effect as far as the spread of elicited density forecasts are concerned. A 
much smaller change in the RGDP bin definitions was made in 2009Q2, from 
“ 2< - ”,…, “ 6> ” to “ 3< - ”,…, “ 6> ”. Though it is hard to see from the figures 
the effects of this change, nonetheless, our regressions will include a new 
indicator variable tnewbin  for both PGDP inflation and RGDP growth. This 
variable is equal to ‘0’ up to 2013Q4 and ‘1’ thereafter for PGDP inflation 
forecasts, and ‘0’ up to 2009Q1 and ‘1’ thereafter for RGDP growth forecasts. 
The subfigures for average skewness mS  show that inflation density forecasts tend 
to be positively skewed whereas output growth forecasts tend to be negatively 
skewed. That is, forecasters tend to perceive ‘upside risks’ for inflation and 
‘downside risks’ for output growth. A major exception is at the end of 2009 when 
there was a sudden swing to positive skewness in real output growth forecasts. 
The largest changes in skewness comes in horizons 0 and 1. 
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The patterns of dispersion in the bottom rows of Figures 2.4(a) and (b) 
show larger dispersion in the forecast medians at long horizons for both variables, 
and smaller dispersion at shorter horizons. At the short horizons this might again 
be due to the fact that there is less to disagree about, but the fall in dispersion 
seems to be present at all horizons. There appears to be more disagreement at 
horizon 0 for PGDP inflation than RGDP growth. This has also been noticed in 
other point forecast datasets (e.g. Patton and Timmermann, 2010), and it is seen 
here that this regularity extends to density forecasts as well. Dispersion appears to 
fall slightly for the range, and rise slightly for the skewness, for RGDP growth 
forecasts as horizon decreases. These patterns are less noticeable for PGDP 
inflation forecasts. Nonetheless, there is variation over time in the dispersion of all 
three characteristics of the density forecasts.  
2.3 Macroeconomic, Policy, and Forecaster Uncertainty 
 We have already described our measure of self-reported forecaster 
uncertainty, namely ,
m
t hR , the average of individual density forecast range , ,
m
i t hR  
taken over all forecasters at each survey date. In this section, we discuss recently 
developed measures of two different notions of uncertainty, namely 
macroeconomic uncertainty, and policy uncertainty, and explore the relationship 
between these measures of uncertainty, and forecaster uncertainty. Our main 
objective, which we will turn to in the next section, is to see how dispersion in 
density forecasts correlate with these three different “types” of uncertainty.  
 It is a well-known fact that macroeconomic variables are easier to forecast 
in some periods than at others because the volatility of their unpredictable 
components vary over time. Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015) develop an index of 
macroeconomic uncertainty (which we refer to as tMU ) comprising a weighted 
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average of conditional root mean square forecast errors for a wide range of 
macroeconomic variables: 
1
( )yN yt j jtjMU w U k==å  
 
where k  refers to the forecast horizon, and tI  is a large information set on which 
the forecasts are based. Their set of macroeconomic variables include real output 
and income, employment, manufacturing and trade sales, consumer spending, 
housing starts, and many more, totaling 132 variables. The forecast errors for 
these variables were derived from a factor model utilizing these and 147 financial 
variables. They calculate macroeconomic uncertainty indices for 1, 3, and 12k =  
months. We utilize all three, but report results only for 3k = .  
 Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) develop an economic policy uncertainty 
index based on human and automated searches of the archives of ten large 
newspapers. This index quantifies the volume of relevant news coverage by 
counting the number of articles related to policy uncertainty starting from January 
1985 (monthly average of the standardized number of articles, scaled to an 
average of 100). We use this data series, downloaded from their website and 
referred to hereafter as tPU , as a direct measure of policy uncertainty. We 
aggregate the monthly index to quarterly frequency by taking the average over 
each quarter. The left column of Figure 2.5 displays the two indices, where it can 
be seen that tPU  is considerably more volatile than tMU . The two series are 
correlated, but only moderately so, at approximately 0.40,    
U jt
y (k) = E[( y j ,t+k − E[y j ,t+k | It ])
2 | It ]
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The three uncertainty indices considered in this paper tMU , tPU  and ,
m
t hR , 
can be viewed along the objective-subjective spectrum, with tMU  being a purely 
objective measure, ,
m
t hR  being a purely subjective notion, and tPU  being 
somewhere in between. We are interested in how dispersion of density forecasts 
are correlated with these. The right column of Figure 2.5 displays ,
m
t hR , with the 
higher line representing average forecaster uncertainty relating to forecasts for the 
following year, and the lower line relating to forecasts for the current year. These 
figures give a time-series view of ,
m
t hR  whereas the upper middle diagrams in 
Figures 2.4(a) and (b) show ,
m
t hR  as a function of horizon, for various years. The 
declining forecaster uncertainty gives rise to the periodicity, especially for the 
lower horizon forecasts. To explore how subjective forecaster uncertainty relates 
to the two other measures of uncertainty, we run the regression 
, 0 1 1 7 7 8 9 1, * 10 , 11 12 ,...
m m m
t h t t t t h t h t t t hR h h newbins R M PU MUb b b b b b b b e-= + + + + + + + + +
   (1) 
for both PGDP inflation and RGDP growth, where 1 7,...,t th h  are horizon dummies. 
The variable 1, *
m
t hR - , which we will refer to as “lagged individual uncertainty”, is 
included to capture persistence in range across consecutive surveys ( * 1h h= +  for 
0,1,2,4,5,6h =  and * 3h h= -  for 3,7h = ). To allow for omitted factors at each 
survey date, we cluster standard errors by year and quarter, allowing errors to be 
correlated at horizon pairs (0,4), (1,5), (2,6) and (3,7) within each year. The 
regression results are displayed in Table 2.1. We also produce ‘split-sample’ 
versions of each regression, separating observations associated with ‘current-year’ 
forecasts from ‘next-year’ forecasts. 
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 Overall, there are substantial differences in the results for PGDP inflation 
and RGDP growth. Some of our results are consistent with previous research 
using different methodologies. For instance, the coefficients on lagged individual 
uncertainty show persistence, especially for short-horizon RGDP growth forecasts 
whereas for PGDP inflation this persistence is weaker and only for longer-horizon 
forecasts. The coefficients on ,
m
t hM  are significant for PGDP inflation (short-
horizon). This is consistent with results from previous research which find that 
positive changes in anticipated inflation is associated with greater uncertainty 
(Lahiri and Liu 2006, Rich and Tracy 2010).  
For PGDP inflation, the correlations between average individual 
uncertainty and either macro or policy uncertainty seems non-existent, except for 
a small negative correlation with tPU  for the longer-horizon density forecasts. 
This suggests little co-movement between forecaster uncertainty and the two other 
measures of uncertainty. For RGDP growth, the coefficients on tPU  suggest that 
average forecaster uncertainty is correlated with policy uncertainty for RGDP 
growth, and that this correlation is mainly at short-horizon forecasts. Average 
forecaster uncertainty is strongly negatively correlated with tMU . This is most 
likely because the largest variation in tMU  in our sample occurred during the 
2007-2009 recession, when there was little doubt regarding the state of RGDP 
growth.  
 Another interesting set of results can be derived from the horizon dummies. 
Earlier we noted from the top diagrams of the second columns of Figures 2.4(a) 
and (b) that range falls with horizon, and that this could be due to less uncertainty 
because forecasters have more information, or because in horizons 0, 1, and 2, 
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only 1, 2, and 3 quarters worth of growth is being forecasted, whereas for horizons 
3 to 7, all four quarters of annual growth are being forecasted. If we assume 
annual growth to be the sum of four independent quarters of growth 
1 2 3 4x x x x+ + + , each with variance 2s ,  then at horizon 0 only 4x  is being 
forecasted, with variance 2s , whereas at horizon 1, it is 3 4x x+  that is being 
forecasted, with variance 22s . If we take the range as equivalent to some 
multiple of standard deviation, the ratio of the horizon 1 to horizon 0 range should 
be 2 . Likewise, the ratio of the horizon 2 to horizon 1 range should be 3/ 2 , 
and the ratio of the horizon 3 to horizon 2 range should be 2 / 3 . Thereafter, the 
ratio of the ranges should be one. The ratios implied by the constant term and 
horizon dummy coefficients is consistent with this pattern for RGDP growth, 
though for PGDP inflation forecasts we only observe the fall in range as we move 
into the lowest horizon.  
 Finally, the strong significant (negative) coefficient on tnewbins  confirms 
that the reduction in the overall bin range for PGDP inflation that occurred after 
the 2013Q4 survey led to a large reduction in the range reported by forecasters. 
This is, of course, obvious from Figure 2.4(a) and Figure 2.6. The smaller 
(positive) effect in RGDP growth where there was a smaller widening of the 
overall range provided to the forecasters is also significant at the longer horizons. 
As mentioned earlier, this may suggest that measures of individual uncertainty 
derived from density forecasts may be subject to a framing effect. It may of course 
be the case that both forecast surveyor and forecasters are reacting to the same 
information. Furthermore, this does not necessarily invalidate our use of direct 
measures of individual uncertainty from density forecasts, although it does 
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emphasize the need to control for changes in bins offered to the forecasters, and it 
does warrant caution in the interpretation of self-reported measures of uncertainty, 
at least as elicited using the methods currently employed in surveys of density 
forecasts. 
 We noted earlier that density forecasts for inflation tend to be positive 
skewed, whereas density forecasts for output growth tend to be negative. We run 
regressions similar to (2), replacing mR  with mS , and include mR  as a regressor: 
, 0 8
9 1, * 10 , 11 , 12 13 ,
(horz. dummies) ...mt h t
m m m
t h t h t h t t t h
S newbins
S M R PU MU
b b
b b b b b e-
= + +
+ + + + + +
     (2) 
The results are reported in Table 2.2. Overall the results are harder to interpret. 
We leave out the horizon dummies and constant as there is nothing interesting to 
report. We note a persistence in skewness for both PGDP inflation and RGDP 
growth density forecasts, and a negative correlation between expected levels and 
skewness, meaning that as expected levels go up, density forecasts become less 
skewed (inflation) or more negatively skewed (output growth). Skewness in 
density forecasts of output growth appears to be negatively correlated with policy 
uncertainty, whereas skewness in density forecasts of inflation are negatively 
correlated with macro-uncertainty. Overall, increased uncertainty appears to 
reduce skewness (inflation) or increase negative skewness (output growth).  
2.4 Main Results  
 We explore in this section the behavior of dispersion in the individual 
density forecasts, as summarized by their location, range, and skewness statistics 
,t hM
s , ,t hR
s , ,t hS
s . We explore in particular the relative degrees to which average 
forecaster uncertainty ( ,
m
t hR ) and uncertainty in the overall macroeconomic 
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environment (as measured by tMU  and tPU ) can explain the degree of 
dispersion observed in these three statistics. We also include the average values of 
location and skewness, ,
m
t hM  and ,
m
t hS , in the regressions, and lagged dispersion to 
capture persistence in overall dispersion from one quarter to the next. We include 
as a further control dispersion in the forecasters’ yield spread (nominal rate on 10-
year T-bonds minus the nominal rate of 3-month T-bills) in the inflation forecast 
dispersion regressions, as the year spread is commonly viewed as good predictors 
of inflation (even if recent evidence suggest that this might not be the case, e.g., 
Ang, Bekaert, and Wei 2007, Stock and Watson 2009, Rossi and Sekhposyan 
2010). The yield spread may also have good predictive power for output growth 
(Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991, Estrella and Mishkin 1998, Hamilton and Kim 
2002), although there is evidence that short-term interest rates forecast output 
growth better than spreads (Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei 2006). Although we have run 
the regressions for both the short-rate and the yield spreads for output growth 
forecast dispersion, we report only the regressions with the short rate, and mention 
the changes that occur when the spread is used. Finally, dispersions were seen in 
Figures 2.4(a) and (b) to change systematically with horizon, and we include 
horizon dummies to allow for this.  
, 0 8 9 1, *
10 , 11 , 12 , 13 14 15 ,
(horz. dummies) ...t h t t h
m m m
t h t h t h t t t h
M newbins M
M R S spread PU MU
s s
s
b b b
b b b b b b e
-= + + +
+ + + + + + +
 (3) 
The regressions are repeated for ,t hR
s  and ,t hS
s . As with equations (1) and (2), we 
again cluster standard errors by survey date to account for possible correlations in 
the error terms associated with the two forecasting horizons at each time period.  
2.4.1 Dispersion in Medians 
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We present the results for PGDP inflation in Table 2.3 and for RGDP 
growth in Table 2.4, with five versions of each equation, a baseline (a) without 
spread, macro uncertainty, and policy uncertainty, a second (b) including spread, 
and a third version including all variables (c). For the full set of variables, we run 
the regression for all horizons (c), and then splitting the sample into that for the 
shorter horizons (d) and the longer horizons (e). Splitting the sample allows us to 
analyze the behavior of dispersion of short-horizon and ‘long-horizon’ forecasts. 
The key results from these regressions is that the coefficients on 
macroeconomic uncertainty are significant and positive, while forecast uncertainty 
plays little role in explaining dispersion of medians. The estimates in column (c) 
in both Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that for both variables, dispersion is positively 
correlated with direct measures of macroeconomic (and policy) uncertainty, even 
after controlling for forecast horizon, lagged dispersion, and other variables. The 
evidence for the macroeconomic uncertainty index is more convincing than that 
for the policy uncertainty index, the coefficients on which are insignificant in 
columns (d) and (e) for both variables. The coefficient on MU  is larger in the 
‘long-horizon’ regression than in the short horizon regression, where the 
coefficient is not significant. This is particularly interesting as the macro-
uncertainty index that we use measures predictability of a 3-month horizon. This 
suggests that dispersion is correlated to prevailing ‘spot’ levels of macroeconomic 
uncertainty, more so in the long-horizon where presumably there is less 
information of relevance to the forecasted variable. The coefficient in the short-
horizon regression is not significant, though the value is still reasonably large. For 
PGDP inflation, the coefficients on average levels of forecast uncertainty are 
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largely insignificant (they are only mildly significant in columns (d) and (e) of 
Table 2.3, the latter of the ‘wrong’ sign).  
 While the key results of interest are regarding the uncertainty indices, 
Table 2.3 also contain a number of other interesting results. The regression result 
for PGDP inflation in Table 2.3 show that lagged dispersion is large and 
significant, indicating that there is persistence in the level of dispersion from 
survey to survey, and this is true after controlling for horizons. This result is 
different from the persistence in the relative ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’ of 
individual forecasters (e.g., as observed in Consensus Economics forecast data by 
Patton and Timmermann 2010) which has more to do with relative rankings of the 
forecasters; our result says that the overall degree of dispersion is persistent. The 
coefficient becomes smaller as more explanatory variables are included, first 
spread then the uncertainty indices. It is interesting that the coefficient on lagged 
dispersion is larger for the short horizon forecasts than the long-horizon ones 
(comparing columns (d) and (e)) which may say something regarding the way the 
forecasters process information. The regression result for RGDP growth in Table 
2.4 show similar results, with some important differences. Again, lagged 
dispersion in density forecast medians is large, positive, and significant, decaying 
as more explanatory variables are included. However, this coefficient is much 
smaller (and not significant) in the short-horizon regression, whereas it remains 
large and significant in the long-horizon regression. This may indicate more 
information processing in the shorter horizons as new information arrives. 
The coefficient estimates on the horizon dummies also show some 
interesting patterns. In column (a) of Table 2.3, the horizon dummies imply 
decreasing dispersion with decreasing horizon, though less so in the regressions 
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with the uncertainty indices. The decreasing dispersion with decreasing horizon is 
also less clear in for output growth, except perhaps for horizons 0 and 1. However, 
there does appear to be a spike in the dispersion at horizons 3 and 7, which 
corresponds to forecasts made in the first survey of the year. The spike in 
dispersion at the start of each year may suggest that views and information tend to 
be reevaluated or incorporated at the start of the year. These findings may support 
information-rigidity type explanations for dispersion, or it may be that annual-
frequency variables (or annual-frequency versions of variables) are taken into 
account at the start of the year. 
For PGDP inflation, the coefficient on the dispersion of forecasts on yield-
spread is significant, i.e., the dispersion in forecasters’ views regarding inflation is 
positively correlated to their dispersed views regarding spread. The coefficient on 
spread remains significant, though smaller, after inclusion of the uncertainty 
indices. Similarly, for RGDP growth, the coefficient of the T-bill rate forecast 
dispersion is positive and significant in the short-horizon forecasts. (The 
coefficient of the spread forecast dispersion is much weaker, when we replace the 
T-bill rate dispersion with the dispersion in spread), which is consistent with the 
Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006) evidence that short-term interest rates forecast 
output growth better than spread. 
As for the average levels of density forecast medians and skewness, they 
are by and large insignificant across Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The exception appears to 
be for overall level of the density forecast median. In regressions (a) and (b) of 
Table 2.4, dispersion in density forecast medians are negatively correlated with 
the overall expected levels of growth. As noted in Patton and Timmermann (2010), 
this is a result consistent with macroeconomic models that incorporate 
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heterogeneous information. However, this correlation vanishes when macro and 
policy uncertainty are included in the regression.  
2.4.2 Dispersion in Range and Skewness 
The regressions for the dispersion of individual density forecast ranges are 
given in Table 2.5. The horizon dummies show that the forecasters disagree more 
on uncertainty as the forecast horizon declines. This is quite different from what 
was found for forecaster uncertainty and disagreement in medians. With the 
arrival of new information, forecasters adjust the shape of their forecasts and 
become more heterogeneous. This is generally true for both variables. For 
inflation, there appears to be very little persistence in the overall level of 
forecaster uncertainty, whereas the coefficient on lagged range dispersion is much 
stronger in the short-horizon regressions for output growth. The coefficients on 
the average level of forecast uncertainty is significant and positive, i.e., there is 
more disagreement in individual uncertainty when the average level of uncertainty 
is high. This indicates that there are some forecasters who tend always to report 
low uncertainty, even as others are reporting high uncertainty. More interesting is 
that dispersion in inflation and output growth forecaster uncertainty do not 
respond to policy uncertainty at all, or macro uncertainty in the short horizon, and 
respond differently to macroeconomic uncertainty for long-horizon forecasts.  
Dispersion in inflation forecaster uncertainty rises as macroeconomic uncertainty, 
indicating that the degree of heterogeneity in perceived uncertainty increases 
during more volatile periods. However, for output growth the effect is strongly 
and negatively significant, which may suggest that in periods where substantial 
uncertainty in real output growth is detected, forecasts update their perceived 
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uncertainty to a higher level consistently and thus demonstrate a lower 
disagreement in forecaster uncertainty. 
 Table 2.6 shows the regressions for dispersion in skewness. The horizon 
dummies are all insignificant, and are left out of the output. Columns (a) and (d) 
are regressions on the full-sample, whereas columns (b) and (e) are the short-
horizon forecasts, and (c) and (f) are the long-horizon forecasts. It does not appear 
that any of our variables can explain variations in the dispersion of individual 
density forecast skewness. There is no response to either policy and 
macroeconomic uncertainty for both variables. There are also no significant 
effects from either the dispersion of yield spreads or T-bill rates. There are some 
significant results regarding overall levels of skewness, but these are harder to 
interpret. While there are interesting results explaining the behavior of overall 
levels of skewness (Table 2.2), it seems there is no accounting for why the 
forecaster differ in the shape of their forecast densities.    
2.4.3 Robustness Check 
In this section, we conducted three robustness analyses to test the validity 
of   our results. First, as shown in Figure 2.5, there is a spike in macroeconomic 
uncertainty during the crisis period in 2009. We would like to check whether the 
key findings are still present in the results and some confusing patterns potentially 
resulted from the spike in macroeconomic uncertainty would disappear when the 
crisis period is excluded. Second, we further examine the components of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, financial uncertainty and real uncertainty, to see 
which elements really matter in explaining dispersion. Finally, we add the 
components of policy uncertainty to check the robustness of our results and 
identify potential differences in their impact on disagreement. 
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A Excluding Crisis Period 
Most of the results in the robustness check are consistent with the main 
analysis in the robustness check except for two important differences. First, after 
excluding crisis period, we find that macroeconomic uncertainty has quite limited 
effect in dispersion of density forecast medians of inflation. This shows that 
dispersion in forecasts for inflation are mainly affected by policy uncertainty and 
only responses to macroeconomic uncertainty in the very volatile period. Second, 
the surprising pattern found in Table 2.1 for average forecaster uncertainty of 
output growth, that 𝑃𝑈 and 𝑀𝑈 have significant and opposite effect, disappears in 
the regression excluding the crisis period. Table 2.8 compares the results of the 
full sample (shown in left three columns) and excluding-crisis sample (shown in 
right three columns). The regression with full sample shows that forecaster 
uncertainty is positively correlated with 𝑃𝑈 but negatively related to 𝑀𝑈, which is 
quite confusing and we attribute it to the spike of 𝑀𝑈 during the crisis in 2009. 
The right panel verifies this explanation as we no longer observe any significant 
relationship between forecaster uncertainty and the other two uncertainty 
measures. This confirms our conclusion that forecaster uncertainty is hardly 
correlated with either 𝑃𝑈 or 𝑀𝑈. 
B Components of Macroeconomic Uncertainty 
JLN exploit two datasets to form forecasts and construct objective 
measures of uncertainty. The first dataset, denoted 𝑋%, consists of 132 (134 in the 
latest version) mostly macroeconomic series. The other one, denoted 𝑋&, consists 
of 147 (148 in the latest version) financial time series. They combine the macro 
and financial datasets together to estimate forecasting factors in these 279 series, 
but estimate macroeconomic uncertainty for the individual uncertainties in the 132 
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macro series only. This means that the macro uncertainty measure we use 
excludes the financial series. To further analyze which component of the macro 
uncertainty contributes more to our findings, we refer to another related study of 
Ludvigson, Ma and Ng (2015), which explicitly distinguishes macro uncertainty 
from financial uncertainty by constructing a measure of uncertainty based on the 
147 financial time series in 𝑋&  and obtains the real uncertainty based on real 
activity variables in 𝑋%. Table 2.7 summarizes the major difference of the three 
uncertainty measures. 
The robustness tests show that macro uncertainty ( 𝑀𝑈 ) and real 
uncertainty (𝑅𝑈) have similar power in explaining dispersion among medians of 
density forecasts for both inflation and output growth. However, when we 
substitute financial uncertainty (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑈) into the regression, the results are quite 
different for the two variables. 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑈 has little effect on PGDP inflation, but shows 
even more strong correlation with RGDP growth.  
 The robustness tests for dispersion in range and skewness give similar 
conclusion to those in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 in terms of both significance and 
magnitude of the coefficients.  
 The robustness tests reinforce our findings that macro uncertainty plays an 
important role in determining dispersion of density forecasts. By further 
examining the role of components of macro uncertainty, we find that dispersion in 
medians of inflation forecasts is mainly affected by uncertainty in macro 
indicators while that of output growth forecasts is more sensitive to uncertainty in 
financial series.  
C Components of Policy Uncertainty 
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Recently, the policy uncertainty index developed by Baker, Bloom and 
Davis is enriched by a set of elements: economic policy uncertainty, monetary 
policy, fiscal policy (taxes or spending), taxes, government spending, health care, 
national security, entitlement programs, regulation (and financial regulation), 
trade policy, sovereign debt and currency crises. Accordingly, we extend our 
robustness analyses to include all the categories to investigate which of them plays 
a more important role in explaining dispersion. The results suggest that, among all 
the components, national security and trade policy have little effect in explaining 
dispersion, while financial regulation has strong effect that dominates 𝑀𝑈, with 
the effect of 𝑀𝑈  disappearing when including financial regulation in the 
regression. The rest of the factors show patterns that are similar to our main 
analysis. Overall the result in this part is consistent with our main finding that 
dispersion is strongly correlated to the macro and policy uncertainty. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
We explore the role of uncertainty in explaining dispersion in the median, 
central 90% interval, and a skewness measure of professional forecasters’ density 
forecasts of real output growth and inflation. We consider three separate notions 
of uncertainty: an objective measure of macroeconomic uncertainty capturing the 
fact that macroeconomic variables are easier to forecast at some times than at 
others, policy uncertainty, and forecaster uncertainty. 
The empirical evidence suggests that dispersion among forecasters in 
medians is related to overall macroeconomic uncertainty, and to a lesser extent 
policy uncertainty. The dispersion shows a different pattern in short horizon 
versus longer horizon. In longer horizon, we observe a larger but smoother degree 
of disagreement which relies more on past information (e.g., lagged dispersion) 
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and overall macroeconomic uncertainty index while the degree of dispersion is 
more related to controls closely linked to new information such as dispersion in 
interest rates in short horizons.  
The link between macroeconomic uncertainty and forecast dispersion 
appears to apply mainly to the location of the density forecasts, and is much 
weaker for dispersion in forecaster uncertainty. As for the dispersion in forecaster 
uncertainty, our results provide evidence that professional forecasters are 
heterogeneous in the way they revise their subjective forecast distributions: the 
dispersion in forecaster uncertainty rises as forecast horizon shortens, and exhibits 
a positive correlation with average forecaster uncertainty, suggesting that some 
forecasters tend not to revise their reported levels of uncertainty upwards. 
Dispersion in forecaster uncertainty is positively correlated with macroeconomic 
economy uncertainty only in the long run, though in opposite directions for 
inflation and for real output forecasters. In the latter case, forecasters disagree less 
on perceived uncertainty when there is an increase in real output uncertainty. For 
skewness there appears no link whatsoever between dispersion and macro, policy, 
or forecaster uncertainty (or any of our other controls). 
In order to test for the validity of our results, we conducted several 
robustness analyses from three dimensions. First, we check the results using 
sample excluding this period to see whether the key findings are still present in the 
results and some confusing patterns potentially resulted from the spike in 
macroeconomic uncertainty would disappear. The results confirm our conclusion 
that forecaster uncertainty is hardly correlated with either 𝑃𝑈 or 𝑀𝑈. Second, we 
examine the components of macroeconomic uncertainty, financial uncertainty and 
real uncertainty, to see which elements really matter in explaining dispersion. The 
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tests reinforce our findings that macro uncertainty plays an important role in 
determining dispersion of density forecasts. By further examining the components 
of macro uncertainty, we find that dispersion in medians of inflation forecasts is 
mainly affected by uncertainty in macro indicators while that of output growth 
forecasts is more sensitive to uncertainty in financial series. Finally, we add the 
components of policy uncertainty to check the robustness of our results and 
identify potential differences in their impact on disagreement. The results suggest 
that, among all the components, national security and trade policy have little effect 
in explaining dispersion, while financial regulation has strong effect that 
dominates 𝑀𝑈. The rest of the factors show similar results to our main analysis. 
The analysis in this part is consistent with our main results that dispersion is 
strongly correlated to the macro and policy uncertainty. 
Overall, average forecaster uncertainty appears to have little role in 
explaining forecast dispersion. Furthermore, there is evidence that forecaster 
uncertainty appears to be affected by survey design and there appears a need for 
further research into forecaster uncertainty elicitation methods. 
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Figure 2.1 Point Forecasts and Density Forecasts of SPF 
Left diagram: point forecasts of all forecasters for 1996 PGDP inflation from 8 
surveys. Horizons 7 to 4 forecasts were made in the 1995Q1-Q4 surveys, and 
horizons 3 to 0 forecasts were made in the 1996Q1-Q4 surveys. Right column 
shows the three key characteristics (median, range and skewness) of density 
forecasts of all forecasters for 1996 PGDP inflation from the same 8 surveys. 
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Figure 2.2 Density Forecasts: Example 
Density forecasts of annual average RGDP growth in 2010 made by Forecaster 
516 in the 2009Q1 and 2010Q1 surveys. 
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Figure 2.3 Density Forecasts vs Point Forecasts 
Plots of density forecast medians against forecasters corresponding point forecast, 
full and matched samples.  
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Figure 2.4 Features of Density Forecasts 
Figure 2.4(a) PGDP. Top row: average of individual PGDP inflation density 
forecast medians, range, and skewness. Bottom row: standard deviation of 
individual PGDP inflation density forecast medians, range, and skewness, 
depicting density forecast dispersion. Each line corresponds to a target year, all 
plotted against forecast horizon.  
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Figure 2.4(b) RGDP. Top row: average of individual RGDP growth density 
forecast medians, range, and skewness. Bottom row: standard deviation of 
individual RGDP growth density forecast medians, range, and skewness, depicting 
density forecast dispersion. Each line corresponds to a target year, all plotted 
against forecast horizon. 
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Figure 2.5 Uncertainties 
Top left displays the time series plot of macroeconomic uncertainty tMU . Bottom 
left shows the time series plot of policy uncertainty tPU . Diagrams in the right 
column show forecast uncertainty for PGDP Inflation and RGDP growth 
corresponding to the current and following year forecasts made at each survey.   
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Table 2.1 Average Forecaster Uncertainty 
Variable                         PGDP Inflation  RGDP Growth 
  (a) (b) (c)  (d) (e) (f) 
1h   	 0.376
*** 0.394***   0.536*** 0.520***  
 	 (7.18) (7.85)   (10.08) (10.17)  
2h  	 0.513
*** 0.552***   0.841*** 0.820***  
 	 (9.47) (9.92)   (11.81) (11.14)  
3h  	 0.653
*** 0.617***   1.340*** 1.373***  
 	 (11.86) (11.26)   (17.69) (15.69)  
4h  	 0.629
***    1.121***   
 	 (11.48)    (14.82)   
5h  	 0.753
***  0.123***  1.222***  0.107** 
 	 (12.17)  (3.16)  (15.96)  (2.10) 
6h  	 0.819
***  0.181***  1.369***  0.249*** 
 	 (12.47)  (4.42)  (16.49)  (4.77) 
7h  	 0.821
***  0.200***  1.489***  0.351*** 
 	 (13.87)  (3.87)  (19.43)  (5.62) 
Newbin 	 -0.723*** -0.716*** -0.735***  0.089** 0.061 0.119** 
 	 (-10.00) (-10.12) (-7.30)  (2.31) (1.31) (2.31) 
lagged mR   	 0.103 -0.020 0.182*  0.224*** 0.273*** 0.156 
 	 (1.41) (-0.25) (1.83)  (3.32) (2.94) (1.60) 
mM   	 0.118*** 0.179*** 0.069  0.004 0.001 0.024 
 	 (3.90) (5.03) (1.49)  (0.19) (0.06) (0.48) 
PU   	 -0.024 0.066 -0.106**  0.101** 0.153** 0.055 
 	 (-0.66) (1.52) (-2.44)  (2.03) (2.32) (0.81) 
MU   	 0.194 0.113 0.225  -0.467** -0.512* -0.411* 
 	 (1.12) (0.61) (1.01)  (-2.53) (-1.68) (-1.69) 
Constant 	 1.155*** 1.241*** 1.764***  1.434*** 1.310*** 2.722*** 
	 	 (5.86) (6.11) (6.07)  (4.91) (2.98) (6.82) 
Obs. 	 198 99 99  198 99 99 
2R   	 0.88 0.86 0.84  0.88 0.85 0.40 
r(1) 	 1.326 1.317   1.374 1.397  
r(2) 	 1.089 1.097   1.155 1.164  
r(3) 	 1.084 1.036   1.219 1.260  
r(4) 	 0.987    0.921   
r(5) 	 1.070  1.070  1.040  1.039 
r(6) 	 1.035  1.031  1.055  1.050 
r(7) 	 1.001  1.010  1.043  1.034 
Notes: Regression results for average individual uncertainty mR , t-statistics in 
parentheses, calculated from standard errors clustered by year and quarter. 
Regressions (a) and (d) for full sample, regressions (b) and (e) for ‘current year’ 
forecasts, and regressions (c) and (f) for next year forecasts. The entries r(k) are 
the ratios of the average range at horizon k  to horizon 1k - .   
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Table 2.2 Average Individual Skewness 
Variable  PGDP Inflation  RGDP Growth 
  (a) (b) (c)   (d) (e) (f) 
Newbin  0.005 0.013 -0.009 
 
0.013 0.010 0.013 
  (0.22) (0.37) (-0.48) 
 
(1.16) (0.53) (1.62) 
lagged mS    0.392*** 0.403*** 0.271** 
 
0.323*** 0.292*** 0.319*** 
   (4.46) (3.70) (2.49) 
 
(4.04) (3.14) (2.83) 
mM   -0.022** -0.022 -0.015 
 
-0.029*** -0.036*** -0.011 
   (-2.26) (-1.50) (-1.61) 
 
(-3.66) (-3.84) (-1.35) 
mR   0.043* 0.035 0.048** 
 
-0.034 -0.015 -0.054*** 
   (1.79) (0.82) (2.44) 
 
(-1.53) (-0.39) (-3.20) 
PU    -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 
 
-0.029* -0.051* -0.005 
   (-1.06) (-0.63) (-1.23) 
 
(-1.72) (-1.89) (-0.42) 
MU    -0.086** -0.106 -0.059* 
 
-0.039 -0.103 0.018 
   (-2.28) (-1.52) (-1.88) 
 
(-0.58) (-0.87) (0.29) 
Obs  198 99 99 
 
198 99 99 
2R   0.34 0.31 0.46 
 
0.40 0.44 0.25 
Notes: Results for average skewness mS  regressions. Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses, calculated from standard errors clustered by year and quarter. 
Constant and horizon dummies included but omitted from the table. Regressions 
(a) and (d) for full sample, regressions (b) and (e) for ‘current year’ forecasts, and 
regressions (c) and (f) for next year forecasts. 
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Table 2.3 Dispersion of Individual PGDP Inflation Density Forecast Medians 
 Dep. Var. PGDP Inflation Density Forecast Medians 
mM  
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1h   0.005 -0.001 0.009 -0.026 
  (0.20) (-0.04) (0.34) (-0.94)  
2h  0.060* 0.046 0.065** 0.016   (1.84) (1.32) (1.99) (0.47)  
3h  0.157*** 0.123*** 0.132*** 0.076**   (4.39) (3.44) (3.94) (2.04)  
4h  0.107*** 0.066 0.090**    (2.84) (1.59) (2.33)   
5h  0.145*** 0.097** 0.126***  0.048
** 
 (3.87) (2.28) (3.09)  (2.25) 
6h  0.170*** 0.110** 0.145***  0.072
*** 
 (3.71) (2.10) (2.99)  (2.81) 
7h  0.197*** 0.118** 0.149***  0.065
*** 
 (4.51) (2.42) (3.18)  (2.71) newbin -0.055 -0.058 -0.057 0.023 -0.179*** 
  (-1.48) (-1.53) (-1.63) (0.68) (-2.90) 
lagged M d   0.334*** 0.288*** 0.225*** 0.231** 0.157* 
  (5.47) (4.85) (3.85) (2.57) (1.68) 
mM   0.000 0.009 0.027 0.006 0.052* 
  (0.01) (0.52) (1.49) (0.33) (1.91) 
mR   0.015 0.003 -0.006 0.081* -0.112* 
  (0.36) (0.07) (-0.15) (1.94) (-1.69) 
mS   0.082 0.065 0.167 0.149 0.064 
  (0.73) (0.60) (1.65) (1.31) (0.23) 
spread  0.219
*** 0.178*** 0.193** 0.220*** 
   (3.37) (2.83) (2.07) (3.21) PU     0.036
** 0.032 0.025 
    (2.22) (1.42) (0.89) MU     0.184
* 0.135 0.259** 
    (1.85) (0.93) (2.47) constant 0.090 0.086 -0.104 -0.174 0.165 
  (1.37) (1.29) (-1.01) (-1.37) (0.84) 
Obs 198 198 198 99 99 
2R   0.64 0.66 0.69 0.56 0.48 
Notes: Results for dispersion of individual PGDP inflation density forecast 
medians ( M s ) regressions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, calculated from 
standard errors clustered by year and quarter.  
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Table 2.4 Dispersion of Individual RGDP Growth Density Forecast Medians 
 Dep. Var. RGDP Growth Density Forecast Medians 
mM  
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1h   -0.020 -0.019 -0.013 -0.005 
  (-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.39) (-0.15) 
 2h  0.026 0.023 0.039 0.046 
  (0.68) (0.59) (0.93) (0.93) 
 3h  0.215*** 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.138** 
  (4.65) (3.83) (3.84) (2.47) 
 4h  0.113* 0.089 0.105* 
   (1.95) (1.49) (1.76) 
  5h  0.117** 0.081 0.103 
 
0.007 
 (2.03) (1.29) (1.62) 
 
(0.26) 
6h  0.107* 0.062 0.094 
 
0.003 
 (1.72) (0.90) (1.34) 
 
(0.10) 
7h  0.205*** 0.151* 0.173** 
 
0.086** 
 (2.90) (1.95) (2.27) 
 
(2.33) 
newbin -0.044*** -0.033* -0.046*** -0.041* -0.047* 
  (-2.79) (-1.96) (-2.67) (-1.97) (-1.88) 
lagged M d   0.441*** 0.394*** 0.343*** 0.141 0.377*** 
  (5.08) (4.26) (4.42) (1.36) (4.09) 
mM   -0.021** -0.022** -0.008 -0.010 -0.033 
  (-2.35) (-2.54) (-0.94) (-1.32) (-1.38) 
mR   0.041 0.039 0.051 0.055 0.050 
  (1.09) (1.02) (1.37) (1.40) (0.91) 
mS   -0.046 -0.064 0.035 0.008 0.196 
  (-0.44) (-0.60) (0.34) (0.10) (0.61) 
TBill 
 
0.134** 0.086 0.322** 0.045 
  
 
(2.13) (1.29) (2.01) (0.52) 
PU   
  
0.045** 0.038 0.040 
  
  
(2.41) (1.57) (1.29) 
MU   
  
0.233** 0.019 0.387** 
  
  
(2.06) (0.17) (2.30) 
constant 0.065 0.070 -0.204 0.001 -0.136 
  (0.83) (0.89) (-1.53) (0.01) (-0.59) 
Obs 198 198 198 99 99 
2R   0.70 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.51 
Notes: Results for dispersion of individual RGDP growth density forecast 
medians ( M s ) regressions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, calculated from 
standard errors clustered by year and quarter.  
 
 
 45 
Table 2.5 Dispersion of Individual Density Forecast Range 
Variable  PGDP Inflation  RGDP Growth 
  (a) (b) (c)   (d) (e) (f) 
1h    -0.135** -0.093 
  
-0.045 -0.061 
   (-2.38) (-1.43) 
  
(-0.71) (-0.79) 
 2h   -0.207*** -0.141* 
  
-0.138* -0.153 
   (-3.17) (-1.83) 
  
(-1.72) (-1.48) 
 3h   -0.297*** -0.212** 
  
-0.206** -0.199 
   (-3.94) (-2.36) 
  
(-2.12) (-1.52) 
 4h   -0.340*** 
   
-0.272*** 
    (-4.86) 
   
(-2.87) 
  5h   -0.344*** 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.280*** 
 
-0.005 
  (-4.07) 
 
(-0.37) 
 
(-2.69) 
 
(-0.13) 
6h   -0.360*** 
 
-0.044 
 
-0.302*** 
 
-0.029 
  (-3.98) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(-2.68) 
 
(-0.59) 
7h   -0.381*** 
 
-0.065 
 
-0.286** 
 
-0.029 
  (-4.02) 
 
(-1.36) 
 
(-2.40) 
 
(-0.51) 
Newbin  0.239*** 0.114 0.374*** 
 
0.076** 0.045 0.118*** 
   (3.57) (1.50) (3.85) 
 
(2.38) (0.84) (2.90) 
lagged Rd    0.081 0.033 0.039 
 
0.225*** 0.315*** 0.078 
   (1.27) (0.35) (0.44) 
 
(2.96) (3.31) (0.70) 
mM    0.023 0.033 0.028 
 
0.003 0.016 -0.047 
   (0.67) (0.72) (0.62) 
 
(0.14) (0.65) (-1.37) 
mR    0.501*** 0.435*** 0.578*** 
 
0.389*** 0.418*** 0.374*** 
   (6.19) (4.06) (4.75) 
 
(5.49) (4.32) (3.83) 
mS    0.300 0.296 0.479 
 
0.073 0.171 -0.188 
   (1.31) (1.12) (0.91) 
 
(0.31) (0.56) (-0.45) 
Spread/TBill  0.170 -0.075 0.195 
 
0.086 -0.025 0.170* 
   (1.41) (-0.38) (1.53) 
 
(0.91) (-0.07) (1.71) 
PU    -0.039 -0.015 -0.050 
 
-0.017 -0.005 -0.040 
   (-1.38) (-0.41) (-1.48) 
 
(-0.44) (-0.09) (-0.78) 
MU    0.196 -0.019 0.472*** 
 
-0.238 -0.149 -0.376* 
   (1.63) (-0.09) (2.71) 
 
(-1.30) (-0.48) (-1.83) 
Constant  -0.431*** -0.134 -1.159*** -0.009 0.047 -0.193 
   (-2.86) (-0.66) (-4.31) 
 
(0.20) (-0.59) (0.51) 
Obs  198 99 99 
 
196 97 99 
2R    0.55 0.50 0.62 
 
0.59 0.55 0.49 
Notes: Results for dispersion of individual RGDP growth density forecast range 
( Rs ) regressions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, calculated from standard 
errors clustered by year and quarter. Dispersion of yield spread forecasts (spread) 
used for PGDP regressions, dispersion of T-Bill rate forecasts (TBill) used for 
RGDP regressions.  
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Table 2.6 Dispersion of Individual Density Forecast Skewness 
Variable   PGDP    RGDP  
   (a) (b) (c)  (d) (e) (f) 
Newbin 
 
-0.017 -0.005 -0.038 
 
-0.007 -0.017* 0.002 
   (-1.24) (-0.35) (-1.65)  (-1.36) (-1.81) (0.33) 
lagged S d    0.103 0.113 0.039  0.084 0.136 -0.039 
   (1.28) (1.05) (0.33)  (1.27) (1.51) (-0.38) mM    -0.006 -0.012
* 0.002  0.004 0.004 0.009*    (-1.35) (-1.90) (0.28)  (1.56) (1.17) (1.80) mR    0.011 0.027
* -0.023  0.004 0.010 -0.014    (0.86) (1.77) (-1.09)  (0.37) (0.72) (-1.05) mS    -0.033 -0.084
** 0.132  0.031 0.072** -0.137** 
   (-1.00) (-2.44) (1.27)  (0.94) (2.05) (-2.01) Spread/TBill  0.005 -0.071
* 0.029  -0.026 -0.059 -0.021    (0.19) (-1.82) (0.97)  (-1.35) (-0.78) (-1.19) PU    -0.011
* -0.008 -0.017  0.000 0.006 -0.001    (-1.79) (-0.95) (-1.64)  (0.05) (0.85) (-0.12) MU    0.030 0.019 0.061  0.040 0.055 0.044    (1.28) (0.55) (1.24)  (1.62) (1.44) (1.27) Constant  0.132
*** 0.123*** 0.173**  0.106*** 0.075 0.142***   
 
(3.94) (2.90) (2.59) 
 
(3.17) (1.58) (2.70) 
Obs 
 
198 99 99 
 
196 97 99 
2R    
0.20 0.22 0.25 
 
0.22 0.16 0.17 
Notes: Results for dispersion of individual RGDP growth density forecast 
skewness ( Ss ) regressions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, calculated from 
standard errors clustered by year and quarter. Dispersion of yield spread forecasts 
(spread) used for PGDP regressions, dispersion of T-Bill rate forecasts (TBill) 
used for RGDP regressions. The horizon dummies are included in the regression 
but are not included in the table. Columns (a) and (d) are regressions on the full-
sample, whereas columns (b) and (e) are the short-horizon forecasts, and (c) and (f) 
are the long-horizon forecasts. 
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Table 2.7 Components of MU 
Category Dataset Number of series 
(M): Macro All series in 𝑋% 134 
(F): Financial 
(R): Real 
All series in 𝑋& 
Real activity series in 𝑋% 148 73 
Notes: A summary of three uncertainty measures related to 𝑀𝑈 . The macro 
uncertainty is constructed based on the 134 macroeconomic series. The financial 
uncertainty is measured based on the 147 financial time series in 𝑋& . The real 
uncertainty is derived from real activity variables in 𝑋%. 
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Table 2.8 Average Forecaster Uncertainty of RGDP Growth 
Variable                         Full  Excluding Crisis 
  (a) (b) (c)  (d) (e) (f) 
1h   	 0.536
*** 0.520***   0.532*** 0.534***  
 	 (10.08) (10.17)   (11.39) (10.96)  
2h  	 0.841
*** 0.820***   0.854*** 0.860***  
 	 (11.81) (11.14)   (12.59) (12.49)  
3h  	 1.340
*** 1.373***   1.299*** 1.289***  
 	 (17.69) (15.69)   (17.87) (14.19)  
4h  	 1.121
***    1.148***   
 	 (14.82)    (16.46)   
5h  	 1.222
***  0.107**  1.250***  0.100* 
 	 (15.96)  (2.10)  (18.03)  (1.91) 
6h  	 1.369
***  0.249***  1.384***  0.229*** 
 	 (16.49)  (4.77)  (17.27)  (4.22) 
7h  	 1.489
***  0.351***  1.515***  0.357*** 
 	 (19.43)  (5.62)  (19.84)  (5.56) 
Newbin 	 0.089** 0.061 0.119**  0.085* 0.087** 0.081 
 	 (2.31) (1.31) (2.31)  (1.94) (2.04) (1.40) 
lagged mR   	 0.224*** 0.273*** 0.156  0.174** 0.161 0.166* 
 	 (3.32) (2.94) (1.60)  (2.63) (1.62) (1.72) 
mM   	 0.004 0.001 0.024  -0.059** -0.082*** 0.004 
 	 (0.19) (0.06) (0.48)  (-2.24) (-3.02) (0.05) 
PU   	 0.101** 0.153** 0.055  0.066 0.046 0.090 
 	 (2.03) (2.32) (0.81)  (1.13) (0.69) (1.23) 
MU   	 -0.467** -0.512* -0.411*  -0.183 -0.194 -0.301 
 	 (-2.53) (-1.68) (-1.69)  (-0.52) (-0.45) (-0.58) 
Constant 	 1.434*** 1.310*** 2.722***  1.569*** 1.694*** 2.639*** 
	 	 (4.91) (2.98) (6.82)  (4.48) (3.16) (5.96) 
Obs. 	 198 99 99  182 91 91 
2R   	 0.88 0.85 0.40  0.89 0.87 0.37 
Notes: Regression results for average individual uncertainty mR  of output growth, 
t-statistics in parentheses, calculated from standard errors clustered by year and 
quarter. Regressions (a) – (c) for full sample, regressions (d) - (f) for the sample 
excluding crisis (1992-2008 and 2010-2017). 
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Chapter 3 Survey Design and Forecasters’ Behavior: Evidence from Survey 
of Professional Forecasters 
3.1 Introduction 
Density forecasts are nowadays commonly included in professional 
surveys to depict a more complete picture of forecast uncertainty. In particular, 
they provide a direct self-represented measure of forecaster uncertainty, which is 
usually defined in the literature as the average of individual forecaster uncertainty, 
measured by inter-percentile range or standard deviation of each forecaster’s 
density forecast. Surveys of density forecasts therefore serve as a rich resource for 
research on topics pertaining to forecaster uncertainty. Some of the studies focus 
on the features of forecaster uncertainty. Boero, Smith and Wallis (2015) find that 
there is great heterogeneity and persistence in forecaster uncertainty.  
Uncertainty has always been the focus of policy makers but is difficulty to 
quantitatively measure. Thus dispersion, which measures the degree of 
disagreement among forecasters, has been widely taken as a substitute for 
uncertainty. As density forecasts make it possible to measure forecaster 
uncertainty, another set of studies utilize this direct measure to justify how well 
that dispersion can fit the movements of uncertainty (Rich and Tracy, 2008; Boero, 
Smith and Wallis (2008,2015). However, this relationship lacks theoretical 
support and remains a long-lasting debate in the literature. 
Motivated by findings in Chapter two that forecaster uncertainty might be 
significantly affected by the change in survey design, we notice the importance of 
examining how the survey design influences the forecasters’ behavior. In this 
chapter, we explore this question further by taking advantage of changes to the 
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density forecast bins in three important surveys and examining the effect of such 
changes on forecaster uncertainty and dispersion among forecasters. By doing so, 
we are able to contribute to the two major strands of literature trying to investigate 
the features of forecaster uncertainty and the link between dispersion and 
uncertainty through a new dimension. If survey design has unanticipated and 
heterogeneous effects on dispersion and uncertainty, we can not only uncover the 
new features of forecaster uncertainty, but also better understand the confusing 
relationship between dispersion and uncertainty.  
Moreover, our study provides implications on how survey design could 
affect forecasters’ response. Modification of questionnaire in the survey is always 
costly and the designer would not change the survey unless when they have to. 
Unfortunately, there are always situations that force the surveyors to change the 
design. For example, when there is a sudden drop in the economy where the 
underlying indicator falls far beyond the lower bound of the bins, they must adjust 
the bins otherwise no valid information could be drawn from the forecasts: all of 
them are clustered in the lower open interval. There are also cases where the 
change is barely related to real economy: the original bins are poorly set and 
improvement is necessary to make the data more informative. Though such 
changes have been observed in the survey data, very few studies pay attention to 
whether these survey adjustments incur unexpected response of forecasters.  
The surveys included in our sample are Survey of Professional Forecasters 
by the Philadelphia Fed (US-SPF), Survey of Professional Forecasters by the 
European Central Bank (ECB-SPF), and Survey of External Forecasters by Bank 
of England (SEF). They are the most well-known and widely studied surveys of 
professional forecasters. More importantly, they share many common features and 
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thus make a clean setting for further analysis. For example, during the period of 
2008-2009, the countries and regions covered in the data all suffered from a crisis 
- a sudden sharp drop in the real output growth. By looking into the different 
responses of both survey designers and forecasters, we are able to see how such 
interactions take place and affect forecasters’ behaviors. 
In some cases, adjustment of forecast bins reasonably arises from the 
fluctuation of underlying macroeconomic variable. Among the three surveys, 
ECB-SPF is more sensitive to the changes in the underlying indicators while SEF 
is most reluctant to do modifications. For example, during 2008-2009, as 
mentioned above, all the countries and regions in the sample experienced a big 
drop in output growth. The real value was so low that it fell beyond the lower 
bound of the interior intervals in all three surveys. After this surprising shock, 
ECB-SPF adjusted the ranges twice to completely include the full range of 
indictor’s values in the inner intervals. However, SPF and SEF only slightly 
adjusted the intervals by 0.01 to 0.02. In other cases, however, the changes are 
neutral to the economic environment. It occurs when the current ranges are 
consistently larger than the variation of the real indicators, leading the survey 
designers to shrink the total range, sometimes together with the width of the 
intervals, to better fit the possible amplitude of the indicator’s movement. This 
category of changes provides a cleaner setting that allows us to distinguish the 
framing effect from the effect of real economy. The first case where changes to 
survey design are necessitated by the variable (level or dispersion) is responding 
to changes in regimes (values of the underlying variables) while the second case 
where the changes are independent of the values of the variables is not prompted 
by any structural change of the underlying indicators. Hence, whether the second 
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one has any effect on the forecasters behavior would be very interesting and 
provide important implications on survey designers who organize the data and 
analysist as well as policy makers who would draw reference from the surveys. 
Indeed, the two different sets of adjustment in survey design discussed 
above have different impacts on the forecasters’ behavior. We focus on dispersion 
and uncertainty specifically in this study as they are the most interesting measures 
to both researchers and policymakers. The dispersion, defined as the standard 
deviation of medians among different forecasters, only responds to the survey 
design changes triggered by real economy. While the forecaster uncertainty, 
measured by average of the 90 percent range of the individual density forecasts, 
responds to both cases. More importantly, the effects on uncertainty is more 
persistent than on dispersion. 
Our work adds to the literature explaining why forecasters disagree from 
an additional dimension of survey design. Various explanations in the literature 
considering different types of heterogeneity among forecasters have been 
proposed to answer this question. The first one is heterogeneity in information set. 
This relates to information rigidity literature including noisy information model 
(Sims, 2002) where the dispersion stems from uncertain news, and sticky 
information model proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), where forecasters only 
occasionally update their information at different rates due to the cost in updating 
news. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) provide empirical evidence to support 
the sticky information model. Another form of heterogeneity is linked to the 
models used by the forecasters. Branch (2004,2007) finds that forecasters 
dynamically switch between a set of costly alternative prediction models in each 
period. In addition to heterogeneity in models, Patton and Timmermann (2010) 
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and Lahiri and Sheng (2010) show that difference in priors is an important 
determinant of dispersion, especially at longer horizons. Manzan (2011) extends 
the literature by illustrating that heterogeneity in interpretation of news as well 
could explain the source of dispersion. Last but not least, Capistran and 
Timmermann (2009) examine the role of loss function and find that heterogeneity 
in the asymmetric loss function could lead to dispersion. Our results provide 
evidence of the framing effect as potential source of bounded rationality and 
dispersion. 
Our results also clarify the different features between dispersion and 
forecaster uncertainty, which contributes to another strand of literature that 
examine whether dispersion is a good measure for uncertainty. Since uncertainty 
is always the focus of policy makers as it plays an important role in the effect of 
any monetary policies and in absence of a well-accepted measure of uncertainty, 
dispersion is widely taken as a substitute for uncertainty. However, there is neither 
theoretical support nor consistent empirical evidence on the validity of this 
relationship. Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) and Giordani and Soderlind (2003) 
find that the dispersion and uncertainty are highly correlated so that dispersion can 
serve as a reasonable proxy for uncertainty. On the contrary, Rich and Tracy 
(2008) argue that there is little evidence supporting this relationship. Furthermore, 
Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008, 2015) examine this topic using the Bank of 
England Survey of External Forecasters and argue that dispersion is not a good 
proxy for uncertainty, as least during stable periods. Lahiri and Sheng (2010) give 
a contrary argument that dispersion is a reliable measure for uncertainty in a stable 
period but less useful as a proxy in periods with large volatility. Our results 
highlight the different tendency in dispersion and forecaster uncertainty and 
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illustrate why the studies come up with very different conclusions. Co-movements 
are observed during crisis period where dispersion and uncertainty both increase 
significantly, but the persistency of this effect on forecaster uncertainty makes the 
correlation at long run remain unclear. This explains the different correlation 
pattern in different economic environment found in the literature. 
Finally, this paper contributes to the extant literature that explore factors to 
explain the forecast bias made by the professionals. Existing studies indicate that 
analysts’ forecasts of corporate earnings do not meet the classical standards of the 
rational expectations hypothesis and the extent of bias is predictable from publicly 
available information (e.g., Ackert and Athanassakos, 1997; Das, Levine, and 
Sivaramakrishnan,1998), and is greater under higher degree of information 
uncertainty (e.g. Zhang, 2010). In addition, the moods or psychological states of 
people have been shown to affect their judgment and professional forecasts are no 
exception (e.g. Dolvin et al., 2009; Lo and Wu, 2010). For example, Dong and 
Heo (2014) provide evidence of distraction effect by showing that a higher flu 
intensity is associated with a lower degree of disagreement among analysts, while 
pessimism, one of the mood proxy variables, results in lower analyst optimism 
and leads to more pessimistic forecasts among analysts in New Orleans than 
among analysts outside of Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
(Bourveau and Law, 2016). Our results suggest that the existence of behavioral 
bias can be extended to the context of professional economists by providing 
evidence of framing effect in surveys of professional forecasters. This effect has 
important normative implications on survey designers who organize the crucial 
forecast data and analysist as well as policy makers who would draw reference 
from the forecasts. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
surveys and measures of dispersion and uncertainty examined in this study. 
Section 3.3 illustrates the features of the survey design and discusses how they 
change over time in different circumstances. Section 3.4 focus on the main results 
that how dispersion and uncertainty respond to survey changes. Section 3.5 
concludes. 
3.2  Data and Measure 
3.2.1  Data 
The focus of this paper is to explore the relationship between survey 
design and forecasters’ behavior. Table 3.1 summarizes the surveys included in 
the sample of this paper. 
A  US-SPF 
The earliest and best-known density forecasts are from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (US-SPF), a quarterly survey formerly initiated by the 
American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) in 1968Q4 and took over by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia in 1992Q2. The ranges of the survey questions for density forecasts 
and the definition of the variables to predict changed several times. First, we only 
consider the forecasts starting with the 1992Q1 survey, even though the point and 
density forecasts for output and inflation are available all the way back to the first 
survey in 1968Q4. There are several reasons for using the post-1992Q1 sample 
period. First, there were several definition changes to the variables forecasted 
prior to the 1992Q1 survey (for output, from nominal GNP to real GNP to real 
GDP). In some years prior to 1992Q1 the survey covered forecasts for the 
previous and current year, instead of the current and following year. Since 
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1992Q1 the definitions have been stable. Second, in the surveys during 1980s 
(1981Q3 to 1991Q4), the interval widths given for density forecasts switched 
from one percentage point to two percentage point, leading to much cruder density 
forecasts. In addition to this, the intervals provided in some of the earlier surveys 
were sometimes completely misaligned with the expectations of the forecasters, 
resulting in density forecasts with probabilities concentrated in the first or last 
open-ended bins. In contrast, the sample period selected in this paper is much 
cleaner in terms of variable and forecast definitions, and has fewer instances of 
‘misaligned’ bins. The width of interior intervals for GDP growth is 1 percent 
while for inflation, it changed from 1 percent to 0.5 percent in 2004Q1. The 
horizon structure for SPF is quite straightforward and consistently includes only 
fixed event, where respondents are required to provide their expectations for 
current year and following year. Though the survey extended the annual forecast 
horizon two years for real GDP growth in 2009Q2, only current year and 
following year forecasts are considered in this analysis as they consistently 
showed up during the whole sample period (fixed-event scheme): 
1.  calendar year (horizon changes from 3 to 0 from Q1 to Q4),  
2. next calendar year (horizon changes from 7 to 4 from Q1 to Q4),  
B ECB-SPF 
Since 1999 the European Central Bank (ECB) has conducted a quarterly 
survey of expectations for some of the euro-area key macroeconomic variables. 
The survey is known as the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (ECB-SPF). 
In this survey, inflation is defined as the year-to-year percentage change of the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) published by Eurostat and real 
gross domestic product growth is defined as the year-to-year percentage change of 
 57 
real GDP, based on standardised ESA definition. The horizon structure of ECB-
SPF is more complicated than that of US-SPF, containing both fixed-event and 
fixed-horizon scheme. Since the horizon structure changes over time, we focus on 
the following that are consistently appearing in the sample:  
1. current calendar year (horizon changes from 3 to 0 from Q1 to Q4),  
2. next calendar year (horizon changes from 7 to 4 from Q1 to Q4),  
3. “rolling horizon” for the month (for HICP inflation) and quarter (for 
GDP growth) one year ahead of the latest available observation at the 
time of the survey (horizon = 3 for HICP inflation, horizon = 2 for 
GDP growth),  
4. “rolling horizon” for the month (for HICP inflation) and quarter (for 
GDP growth) two year ahead of the latest available observation at the 
time of the survey (horizon = 7 for HICP inflation, horizon = 6 for 
GDP growth). 
The “rolling horizon” scheme, which is also a fixed-horizon scheme, is a 
little tricky in this survey. The horizons are set 1- and 2- years ahead of the period 
(month or quarter) for which the latest official release of the underlying indicators 
is available, and therefore could not be simply identified as 4 or 8 but differ across 
indicators. Take the survey conducted in 2007Q1 for example. The latest release 
of inflation was for December 2006 so the participants were asked for the year-on-
year inflation predictions in December 2007 and December 2008, which 
corresponds to the horizon of 3 and 7, respectively. For GDP growth, on the other 
hand, the latest available release related to 2006Q3 and forecasters were asked for 
expectations for GDP growth in 2007Q3 and 2008Q3, with the horizons being 2 
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and 6 instead. In short, for the fixed-horizon scheme used in this study, the 
horizon is 3 and 7 for inflation and 2 and 6 for GDP growth. 
As for the details of the range specification for the density forecasts, ECB-
SPF has a very flexible adjustment scheme with ranges for density forecasts 
changing over time. While the width of the interior intervals remains constant at 
0.5 percent for both output growth and inflation.  
C  SEF 
Dating back to 1996Q2, the Bank of England initiated a quarterly survey 
of macroeconomic expectations, known as the Survey of External Forecasters 
(SEF). The first appearance of this data was in February 1993 where the Inflation 
Report included information on the point forecasts of inflation made by outside 
forecasters. From February 1996, in addition to the central projections for 
inflation, the forecasters are also asked about the probabilities they attach to 
various possible inflation outcomes. In line with the definition of official inflation 
target, inflation in the survey was first defined as the Retail Prices excluding 
mortgage interest payments (RPIX), and switched to the Consumer Prices Index 
(CPI) from the 2004Q1 survey, following the change in the Bank's official target 
measure in December 2003. As for GDP growth, the point and density forecasts 
have appeared since 1998Q1. 
There is a break in the horizon structure of SEF 2006Q2. Before 2006Q2, 
it asked the forecasters about their predictions at three future points in time 
(combining fixed-event (1,2) and fixed-horizon (3) schemes): 
1. the fourth quarter of the current year (horizon changes from 3 to 0 
from Q1 to Q4); 
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2. the fourth quarter of the following year (horizon changes from 7 to 4 
from Q1 to Q4); 
3. the corresponding quarter two years ahead (horizon = 8). 
While since 2006Q2, the survey changed to pure fixed-horizon scheme: 
1. the corresponding quarter one year ahead (horizon = 4); 
2. the corresponding quarter two years ahead (horizon = 8); 
3. the corresponding quarter three years ahead (horizon = 12). 
Similar to the other two datasets, the survey design of density forecasts, in 
terms of the number of bins, the upper bound and lower bound, and the width of 
the intervals, is evolving over time. The details of the change scheme will be 
presented in the next section. 
3.2.2 Sample for Analysis 
All of the three datasets assign a unique identification number to each 
respondent, so that their individual responses can be tracked over time and their 
point and density forecasts can be matched. This enables us to limit our sample so 
that we only include density forecasts where the median of a forecaster’s the 
density forecast matches the forecaster’s point forecasts. The matching method we 
use is based on the bounds implied by the density forecasts (Engelberg, Manski 
and Williams, 2009). The first step to construct the matched sample is to calculate 
the lower and upper bounds of both subjective median and mean. The interval 
where the median lies in can be obtained from the probabilistic responses directly. 
To calculate lower and upper bounds on the subjective mean, we assume that each 
bin’s probability mass is placed at the bin’s lower and upper endpoint respectively. 
The results are then generated by averaging the lower and upper endpoints 
weighted by the probabilities. If the point forecast is located within any of the two 
 60 
sets of bounds, the density forecast is counted as ‘matched’ to the point forecast. 
The matching takes care of another issue in the sample, that is the presence of 
outliers and unusual observations that appear to be errors of some sort, or are at 
least difficult to otherwise justify. These outliers are also removed via the 
matching process. 
3.2.3 Measures 
As in the previous chapter, we use a set of statistics to describe the 
characteristics of a density forecast. We use ,( )i t hf Y  to denote forecaster i ’s 
period t  density forecast of annual GDP growth or annual inflation made h -
quarters ahead, 0,1,...,7h = . The subscript t  is a quarterly date index (1992Q1, 
1992Q2, etc.) and represents the survey date. As examples, 1992 4,0( )i Qf Y  is 
forecaster i ’s estimate of annual GDP Growth or Inflation over year 1992, made 
in the last quarter of 1992, whereas 1992 4,4( )i Qf Y  denotes the forecaster’s 
prediction for year 1993. The target year is not represented in this notation, and 
must be derived from the survey date t  and the horizon. We use the sample 
starting 1992 1,..., 2016 4t q q= , where 1t -  refers to the previous quarterly date. 
We summarize each density forecast using measures of location and spread. One 
feature of the density forecasts is that the end bins are open-ended, which 
complicates the computation of moment-based and entropy-based statistics. In this 
paper, we use instead the median , ,i t hM , the central 90% range , ,i t hR : 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡,ℎ = 𝑥50,𝑖,𝑡,ℎ 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡,ℎ = 𝑥95,𝑖,𝑡,ℎ − 𝑥5,𝑖,𝑡,ℎ 
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where xa  represents the a -th percentile. Here we use instead the median and the 
central 90% range, whereas the range might be considered a measure of individual 
uncertainty. 
Our main reason for using percentile-based descriptions of the density 
forecasts is to avoid the strong assumptions that are needed for moment-based and 
entropy-based statistics. Of course, the percentile-based statistics that we use also 
has its disadvantages, e.g., it requires interpolation within the bins (we use linear 
interpolation). In addition, the 5th (95th) percentiles cannot be computed if the 
probabilities reported for the first or last bins are greater than 5 (probabilities are 
reported out of 100). This interpolation is also an assumption regarding the shape 
of the distribution, though perhaps a less critical one, as the assumption is only 
required in the bins in which the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles falls. The fact that 
the 5th and 95th percentiles cannot be computed in some cases is also not a major 
issue for our sample period. Finally, recent papers have considered moment- and 
entropy based statistics (Rich and Tracy 2010, Boero et. al. 2008, 2015) for some 
of the issues we examine, so it is interesting to see how our results compare when 
using different measures. 
3.3 Survey Design 
In this section, we focus on the changing scheme of survey design of the 
datasets. Figure 3.1 plots the ranges of interior intervals together with the 
fluctuations of corresponding values of underlying indicators. Several important 
features are highlighted in these figures. First, in addition to changes to survey 
design that are necessitated by inherent changes in the variables predicted, we 
observe some adjustments of forecast bins that are not prompted by any structural 
change of the underlying indicators. For example, the SPF designer reduced both 
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the whole range and interval width of the bins provided in 2014Q1 without any 
significant variation in inflation. This set of changes is neutral to the economic 
environment and occurs when the current ranges are consistently larger than the 
variation of the real indicators during a period and the designers shrink the total 
range, sometimes together with the width of the intervals, to better fit the possible 
amplitude of the indicator’s movement. This category of changes provides a clean 
setting that allows us to distinguish the framing effect from the effect of real 
economic fluctuation. Second, even in response to the economic environment, the 
surveys are quite different in the adjustment strategies. Among the three surveys, 
ECB-SPF are more sensitive to the changes in the underlying indicators while 
SEF is most reluctant to do modifications. For example, during 2008-2009, all the 
countries and regions in the sample underwent a big drop in output growth with 
the real value falling far beyond the lower bound of the interior intervals in all 
three surveys. After this surprising shock, ECB-SPF adjusted the ranges twice to 
completely include the full range of indictor’s values in the inner intervals. 
However, SPF and SEF only slightly adjusted the intervals by 0.01 to 0.02. 
The details of the variations in survey design are depicted in Figure 3.2. 
For US-SPF, there is only one change in the design scheme within sample period 
for both inflation and GDP growth. The changing scheme in GDP growth survey 
is driven by the crisis when there is a sudden drop in real GDP growth while the 
change in inflation survey question is most likely a modification of the survey 
design to best fit the volatility of the underlying variable.  
1. Inflation: [<0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,4-5,5-6,6-7,7-8,>8] changed to [<0,0-
0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,3.5-4,>4] in 2014Q1; 
 63 
2. GDP growth: [<(-2),(-2)-(-1),(-1)-0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,4-5,5-6,>6] 
changed to [<(-3),(-3)-(-2),(-2)-(-1),(-1)-0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,4-5,5-6,>6] 
in 2009Q2; 
ECB-SPF, just like what we observed in Figure 3.1(b), is always ready to 
adjust the bounds of interior intervals to fully cover the real variation of the 
variable predicted. As a result, there are several changes in our sample period and 
all of the adjustments are related to the real economy volatility.  
1. Inflation: 
a. From 1999Q1: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,>3.5] 
b. From 2000Q4: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
c. From 2001Q1: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,>3.5] 
d. From 2008Q3: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
e. From 2009Q2: [<(-2),(-2)-(-1.5),(-1.5)-(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-
0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,>3.5] 
f. From 2010Q1: [<(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-
2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,>3.5] 
2. GDP growth: 
a. From 1999Q1: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
b. From 2000Q2: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,4-4.5,4.5-5,>5] 
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c. From 2001Q1: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
d. From 2008Q4: [<(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-
2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
e. From 2009Q2: [<(-6),(-6)-(-5.5),(-5.5)-(-5),(-5)-(-4.5),(-4.5)-(-
4),(-4)-(-3.5),(-3.5)-(-3),(-3)-(-2.5),(-2.5)-(-2),(-2)-(-1.5),(-1.5)-
(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
f. From 2010Q1: [<(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-
2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
The change pattern is rarer in SEF survey, where the changes in the early 
(pre-crisis) period are not relevant to fluctuations of underlying variables and the 
adjustments in the crisis period are mostly made in response to the changing of the 
economic environment. 
1. Inflation: 
a. From 1996Q2: [<1,1-2.5,2.5-4,4-5.5,>5.5] 
b. From 1998Q1: [<1.5,1.5-2.5,2.5-3.5,>3.5] 
c. From 1999Q2: [<1.5,1.5-2,2.5-3,3-3.5,>3.5] 
d. From 2004Q1: [<1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,>3] 
e. From 2009Q1: [<0,0-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,>3] 
2. GDP growth: 
a. From 1998Q1: [<0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,>4] 
b. From 2004Q1: [<1,1-2,2-3,>3] 
c. From 2008Q4: [<0,0-1,1-2,2-3,>3] 
d. From 2009Q1: [<(-1),(-1)-0,0-1,1-2,2-3,>3] 
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3.4  Main Results 
The focus of this section is how professional forecasters’ behavior changes 
in response to the adjustments of survey design. We examine two important 
measures that attract close attention of the economists: dispersion and forecaster 
uncertainty. Dispersion is defined as the standard error of the medians of the 
forecasters’ density forecasts:  
𝐷𝑡,ℎ = 𝑠𝑡𝑑. 𝑑𝑒𝑣. (𝑀𝑖,𝑡,ℎ) 
and forecaster uncertainty is defined as the mean of the forecasters’ 90% range, a 
proxy of the individual forecaster uncertainty: 
𝑈𝑡,ℎ = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑅𝑖,𝑡,ℎ) 
A  US-SPF 
Figure 3.3 shows an overview of how the dispersion and uncertainty vary 
along the survey date. The vertical line in each plot indicates a change in the 
survey design. The subplots in the left column relates to the dispersion of medians 
of density forecasts and those in the right column relates to the average forecaster 
uncertainty reported by the density forecasts. The top two rows depict the 
measures of inflation forecasts for current year and following year respectively 
and the bottom two show the measures of output growth.  
From the top four figures drawing features of inflation forecasts, we 
observe only one change of the survey in 2014Q1. The change is not driven by the 
inherent change in inflation with the coverage shrinking from 0-8% to 0-4% and 
interval width decreasing from 1% to 0%. There are significant differences in the 
response of dispersion and inflation to this change. Dispersion does not show any 
change in the moving pattern while uncertainty experiences a sudden and 
persistent drop at the change point when the surveyor shrinks both coverage and 
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width of the bins provided to the forecasters. This finding is of great importance 
as this change is not correlated with any economic variable and thus the response 
serves as a strong evidence of behavioral bias. 
As for the GDP growth, the only survey change occurred in 2009Q2, when 
the lower bound of the bins decreased slightly from -2 to -3. This change is 
triggered by the crisis where the real output growth fell suddenly beyond the 
original lower bound -2. Dispersion increases immediately after the crisis being 
observed and the survey design being modified and returns to normal level after 
the crisis. At the same time, uncertainty also increases slightly after the crisis. 
The two survey changes are corresponding to two different cases as we 
defined earlier: the one in inflation survey is independent of underlying variable 
while the one in output survey is responding to the real economic variation. While 
it is intuitive that dispersion and uncertainty increase during the crisis, the unusual 
and significant rise in forecaster uncertainty of inflation at 2014Q1 provides 
strong evidence to framing effect that the survey scheme itself affects the 
forecasters’ behavior. 
B  ECB-SPF 
Compared to the other two surveys, ECB-SPF is more sensitive to the 
changes in the underlying indicators and all the adjustments are made in line with 
the real economy. This provides us with a direct comparison of how dispersion 
and uncertainty respond to the survey change. An overview of the two measures is 
depicted in Figure 3.4. There are four forecasts at each survey date included in our 
sample, corresponding to the four rows of the plots: forecast for the current 
calendar year; the next calendar year; the month (for HICP inflation) and quarter 
(for GDP growth) one year ahead of the latest available observation at the time of 
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the survey; the month (for HICP inflation) and quarter (for GDP growth) two year 
ahead of the latest available observation at the time of the survey. The left two 
columns show dispersion and uncertainty of inflation and the right two columns 
show dispersion and uncertainty of output growth. As the survey changes are all in 
line with the economic variations, there is no significant difference for the two 
variables of inflation and output. Both dispersion and uncertainty respond to real 
economic fluctuations and the measures increase as the economic variables 
become more volatile. However, the dispersion usually goes back to the normal 
level soon after the shock and is more volatile while changes in uncertainty are 
more persistent. These findings are consistent with what we have shown in 
Chapter two that dispersion is highly correlated with macroeconomic uncertainty 
while forecaster uncertainty are more subjective and less linked with 
macroeconomic uncertainty. 
The fixed-horizon scheme exploited in the ECB-SPF allows us to conduct 
the fixed-horizon analysis on the relationship between the measures and horizons. 
Figure 3.5 provides a clear comparison of the features of dispersion and 
uncertainty, with measures of inflation in the first row and measures of output 
growth in the second row. The dispersion is depicted in the left column and 
uncertainty is depicted in the right column. Each graph plots two different 
horizons (3 and 7 for inflation and 2 and 6 for output growth). Both dispersion and 
uncertainty respond to real economic change while effect in uncertainty is more 
persistent. Another interesting fact highlighted in this figure is that disagreement 
in long horizons is usually smaller than that at short horizons while uncertainty is 
totally opposite: long-horizon uncertainty is always larger than short-horizon one. 
This indicates that at long horizon where information is quite limited, the 
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forecasters are more uncertain but disagree less in the first moment of 
expectations. 
C  SEF 
The survey scheme in SEF changed several times within our sample period 
and some changes, especially in the pre-crisis period appear to be independent of 
the underlying indicators while the changes in the crisis period are driven by the 
real economic volatility. This feature provides another clean setting that allows us 
to differentiate the effect of structural break in real economy from the behavioral 
effect. 
Figure 3.6 is an overview of the responses. The changes in the survey are 
highlighted by the vertical lines. There are three forecasts at each survey date in 
SEF but the horizon scheme changed in 2006Q2 from combined fixed-event and 
fixed horizon scheme to pure fixed-event scheme. So we are left with five 
different series in the sample, which are illustrated in the five rows from the top to 
the bottom: forecast for the fourth quarter of the current year (before 2006Q1); the 
fourth quarter of the following year (before 2006Q1); the corresponding quarter 
one year ahead (after 2006Q2); the corresponding quarter two years ahead (full 
sample); the corresponding quarter three years ahead (after 2006Q2). The left two 
columns show dispersion and uncertainty of inflation and the right two columns 
show dispersion and uncertainty of output growth. As we noted in the previous 
section, the two changes in 1998Q1 and 1999Q2 are not responding to any 
structural break in the economy and completely independent of the values of 
inflation. There is no clear response in dispersion as shown in the first column, 
however, both changes lead to steep decline in forecaster uncertainty, illustrated in 
the second column. As for the changes in the crisis that are forced by the 
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economic environment, it is not surprising that both dispersion and uncertainty 
rise immediately. 
 Special attention must be paid to GDP growth on a quite abnormal change 
in 2004Q1, when the economy is quite volatile in the following period but the 
survey designer changed the bin setting from [<0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,>4] to [<1,1-2,2-
3,>3]. Opposite to the intuition that more bins and wider coverage should be 
provided in volatile period to better capture the views of forecasters about future 
economy, the survey reduced both coverage and number of bins. The response is 
also very interesting: the dispersion of medians of density forecasts declines and 
forecaster uncertainty goes up. Though the results might be affected by the limited 
sample (we lose some observations after matching and drop some records without 
valid medians due to the limitation of the survey design), the response is enough 
to provide a note of caution to the data designer and user: poorly designed surveys 
severely limit the performance of forecasts. 
We also conduct the fixed-horizon analysis for SEF. Figure 3.7 compares 
the features of dispersion and uncertainty, with measures of inflation in the first 
row and measures of output growth in the second row. The dispersion is depicted 
in the left column and uncertainty is depicted in the right column. Each graph 
plots three different horizons (4, 8, and 12), with horizon 8 showing up in the data 
for full period. Again, both dispersion and uncertainty respond to real economic 
change while effect in uncertainty is more persistent. Dispersion in short horizon 
is usually larger than that for long horizon especially in the unstable period while 
uncertainty is completely opposite. The seemingly unreasonable change in 
2004Q1 leads to lower dispersion and higher uncertainty during that period, 
suggesting a worse performance of forecasts restricted by the survey design. 
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In summary, the results are consistent with what we observe in the US-
SPF and ECB-SPF datasets, in that both disagreement and uncertainty increase 
when there is a shock to the macroeconomic variables, while the effect on 
disagreement is more transient, and on uncertainty more persistent. Dispersion can 
be affected by real economic change, regardless of the bin changes, but does not 
move with the survey changes that are neutral to economic environment. 
Uncertainty responds to both cases of survey adjustment and the effect will last 
for a long period after the shock. The output growth survey in SEF provides a rare 
survey change case where the modification goes against the evolution of real 
economy in 2004Q1, and our analyses suggest that improper design could worsen 
the performance of density forecasts. 
3.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we examine how the survey design influences the forecasters’ 
behavior. With a comprehensive dataset including three main surveys worldwide, 
namely US-SPF, ECB-SPF, and SEF, we are able to detect and analyze changes of 
the density forecast bins. While the adjustment of forecast bins reasonably arises 
from the fluctuation of underlying macroeconomic variable, there are also cases 
where the modification is neutral to the economic environment. The inclusion of 
three datasets allows us to distinguish response patterns of professional forecasters 
under different categories of survey adjustments. The results suggest that 
disagreement only responds to changes caused by real economy. Uncertainty 
responds to both categories of survey changes and the effect is more persistent. 
These empirical facts highlight the importance of behavioral perspective when 
inferences are drawn from professional forecasters (Clark, Ghosh and Hanes, 
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2018). A more useful study of this issue is essential if we are to draw more 
accurate inferences from such surveys especially regarding forecast uncertainty.  
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Table 3.1 A Summary on Surveys of Professional Forecasters. 
  US-SPF ECB-SPF SEF 
Survey 
organization 
Orginally 
ASA/NBER; 
currently the 
Pheladelphia 
European Central 
Bank 
Bank of England 
Average number of 
respondents in 
matched sample 
30 (after 
1992Q1) 
52 25 
Starting date 1968Q4 
 sample from 
 1992Q1 
1999Q1 1996Q2 
 for inflation 
1998Q1 
 for output growth 
Periodicity Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
Horizon structure Fixed target Fixed target and 
fixed horizon 
1996Q2-2006Q1 
 Fixed target and 
 fixed horizon 
2006Q2-present 
 Fixed horizon 
Inflation  
expectation 
GDP deflator Euro area HICP RPIX before 2003Q4 
CPI after 2004Q1 
Notes: A summary of the surveys included in the sample. Three surveys are 
included: US-SPF, ECB-SPF and SEF. 
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Figure 3.1 Interior Bounds and Fluctuation of Underlying Indicators 
Ranges of interior intervals and the fluctuations of corresponding values of 
underlying indicators. The two horizontal lines indicate the interior bounds of the 
bins provided by the survey to the forecasters and the curve shows the series of 
the underlying variables being predicted. The left subfigure in the top row relates 
to US-SPF and the right one relates to ECB-SPF. The one in the bottom relates to 
SEF.  
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Figure 3.2 Survey Design Variations 
The details of the variations in survey design, with the first one corresponds to the 
details of US-SPF, the second one to ECB-SPF and the last one to SEF. In each 
subfigure, the top part shows variations of inflation survey and the bottom part 
shows that of output survey. The different color highlights the width of the interior 
bins.  
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Figure 3.3 An overview of US-SPF 
An overview of how the dispersion and uncertainty vary along the survey date in 
US-SPF. The vertical line in each plot indicates a change in the survey design. 
The subplots in the left column relates to the dispersion of medians of density 
forecasts and those in the right column relates to the average forecaster 
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uncertainty reported by the density forecasts. The top two rows depict the 
measures of inflation forecasts for current year and following year respectively 
and the bottom two show the measures of output growth.  
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Figure 3.4 An Overview of ECB-SPF 
An overview of how the dispersion and uncertainty vary along the survey date in 
ECB-SPF. The vertical line in each plot indicates a change in the survey design. 
The four rows correspond to the four forecasts at each survey date: forecast for the 
current calendar year; the next calendar year; the month (for HICP inflation) and 
quarter (for GDP growth) one year ahead of the latest available observation at the 
time of the survey; the month (for HICP inflation) and quarter (for GDP growth) 
two year ahead of the latest available observation at the time of the survey. The 
left two columns show dispersion and uncertainty of inflation and the right two 
columns show dispersion and uncertainty of output growth.  
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Figure 3.5 ECB-SPF: Fixed-horizon Analysis 
Comparison of the features of dispersion and uncertainty, with measures of 
inflation in the first row and measures of output growth in the second row. The 
dispersion is depicted in the left column and uncertainty is depicted in the right 
column. Each graph plots two different horizons (3 and 7 for inflation and 2 and 6 
for output growth).  
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Figure 3.6 An Overview of SEF 
An overview of how the dispersion and uncertainty vary along the survey date in 
SEF. The vertical line in each plot indicates a change in the survey design. The 
five rows from top to bottom correspond to the five different series of forecasts in 
the sample: forecast for the fourth quarter of the current year (before 2006Q1); the 
fourth quarter of the following year (before 2006Q1); the corresponding quarter 
one year ahead (after 2006Q2); the corresponding quarter two years ahead (full 
sample); the corresponding quarter three years ahead (after 2006Q2). The left two 
columns show dispersion and uncertainty of inflation and the right two columns 
show dispersion and uncertainty of output growth. 
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Figure 3.7 SEF: Fixed-horizon Analysis  
Comparison of the features of dispersion and uncertainty, with measures of 
inflation in the first row and measures of output growth in the second row. The 
dispersion is depicted in the left column and uncertainty is depicted in the right 
column. Each graph plots three different horizons (4, 8, and 12), with horizon 8 
showing up in the data for full period. 
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Chapter 4 Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
4.1 Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation focuses on the two key features of density forecasts, 
dispersion and uncertainty, and explore underlying determinants of the features 
using three world-wide surveys, US-SPF, ECB-SPF and SEF. It contributes to the 
literature summarized in Chapter One through additional dimensions in terms of 
the effect of uncertainty in dispersion and behavioral perspective.  
Chapter two explores the role of uncertainty in explaining dispersion in 
professional forecasters’ density forecasts of real output growth and inflation. We 
consider three separate notions of uncertainty: general macroeconomic uncertainty 
(the fact that macroeconomic variables are easier to forecast at some times than at 
others), policy uncertainty, and forecaster uncertainty. We find that dispersion in 
individual density forecasts is related to overall macroeconomic uncertainty and 
policy uncertainty, while forecaster uncertainty (which we define as the average in 
the uncertainty expressed by individual forecasters) appears to have little role in 
forecast dispersion. On one hand, our work contributes to the literature by 
extending the analysis on dispersion from point forecasts to density forecasts. 
Though there is a growing literature focusing on density forecast evaluation and 
forecaster uncertainty, very few studies examine the dispersion pattern in density 
forecasts. On the other hand, we exploit various forms of uncertainty to explain 
forecast dispersion, including both subjective and objective measures showing 
different perspective of the economic environment. By doing so, we are able to 
add new elements to the literature examining determinants of dispersion. 
Furthermore, further analysis on forecaster uncertainty and dispersion in this study 
highlights different features of these two important measures represented in 
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density forecasts and helps us better understand the relationship of them. In order 
to test the validity of   our results from three dimensions, we conducted several 
robustness analyses. First, we check the results using sample excluding this period 
to see whether the key findings are still present in the results and some confusing 
patterns potentially resulted from the spike in macroeconomic uncertainty would 
disappear. The results confirm our conclusion that forecaster uncertainty is hardly 
correlated with either 𝑃𝑈  or 𝑀𝑈 . Second, we examine the components of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, financial uncertainty and real uncertainty, to see 
which elements really matter in explaining dispersion. The tests reinforce our 
findings that macro uncertainty plays an important role in determining dispersion 
of density forecasts. By further examining the components of macro uncertainty, 
we find that dispersion in medians of inflation forecasts is mainly affected by 
uncertainty in macro indicators while that of output growth forecasts is more 
sensitive to uncertainty in financial series. Finally, we add the components of 
policy uncertainty to check the robustness of our results and identify potential 
differences in their impact on disagreement. The results suggest that, among all 
the components, national security and trade policy have little effect in explaining 
dispersion, while financial regulation has strong effect that dominates 𝑀𝑈. The 
rest of the factors show similar results to our main analysis. The analysis in this 
part is consistent with our main results that dispersion is strongly correlated to the 
macro and policy uncertainty. 
Chapter three examines the relationship between survey design and 
forecasters’ behavior by exploiting changes to the probability bins supplied to 
forecasters when soliciting density forecasts. While the adjustment of forecast 
bins can reasonably arise from the fluctuation of underlying macroeconomic 
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variable, there are also cases where the modification is neutral to the economic 
environment. Our analysis examines how disagreement and forecaster uncertainty 
respond to the two different categories of survey changes. The results suggest that 
disagreement only responds to changes caused by real economy. Uncertainty 
responds to both and the effect is more persistent. This chapter contributes to the 
literature on characteristics of forecaster uncertainty from the behavioral 
perspective. More importantly, it provides a note of caution on the survey design: 
as the survey design itself could affect the forecasters’ behavior, we should pay 
special attention on the form of the survey questions and be very cautious when 
making any modifications. 
In addition to a summary of the main chapters, this chapter proposes 
further research plan on investigating the features of forecaster uncertainty using 
probability integral transforms (“z-statistics”), a commonly-used test for density 
forecast optimality. The focus is on the shape of the distribution of z-statistics, 
which is informative about the confidence level as well as bias (optimism or 
pessimism) of forecasters. There is evidence of significant hysteresis and that 
survey scheme greatly affects the performance of density forecasts. This study 
would provide a new application of the traditional density forecast evaluation 
method and add to the literature an innovative prospective on analyzing the 
determinants of key features of density forecasts. 
4.2 Future Research 
This section further examines the features of density forecasts from the 
perspective of z-statistics, the probability integral transforms. Z-statistic is first 
proposed and applied to test optimality of density forecasts by Diebold, Gunther 
and Tay (1998). From then on, various optimality test methods have been 
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proposed. We are not performing the optimality test in this chapter, but use a more 
informative format of this statistic, the shape and distributions, to illustrate how 
forecasters’ behavior changes in response to the real economic volatility as well as 
survey changes. 
4.2.1  Data and Methodology 
Similar to Chapter Three, we include the three surveys of professional 
forecasters, US-SPF, ECB-SPF and SEF in our analysis. The respondents are 
professionals from economic agencies and supposed to be relatively homogeneous 
in terms of ability and motivation. However, the analysis in the previous chapters 
indicates that it is not the case. The different design scheme of the three surveys 
allows us to examine the features of this “bounded rationality” in a deeper manner 
and study the potential determinants of forecast dispersion and uncertainty. Before 
discussing the results, we first summarized major differences of the three datasets 
briefly in terms of horizon scheme and question frame. 
A  US-SPF 
The Survey of Professional Forecasters (US-SPF) is the earliest and best-
known density forecasts. It’s a quarterly survey formerly initiated by the 
American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) in 1968Q4 and took over by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia in 1992Q2. The horizon structure for SPF is quite straightforward 
and consistently includes only fixed event, where respondents are required to 
provide their expectations for current year and following year. Though the survey 
extended the annual forecast horizon by two years for real GDP growth starting 
from 2009Q2, our analysis is limited to only current year and following year 
forecasts as they can cover the whole sample period (fixed-event scheme): 
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1. calendar year (horizon changes from 3 to 0 from Q1 to Q4); 
2. next calendar year (horizon changes from 7 to 4 from Q1 to Q4). 
In our sample, we only consider forecasts starting with the 1992Q1 survey, 
as the forecasts in this sample period is much cleaner in terms of both variable and 
forecast definitions. During this period, the specification of questions for density 
forecasts is very stable and changed only once for GDP growth and inflation 
respectively. 
1. Inflation: [<0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,4-5,5-6,6-7,7-8,>8] changed to [<0,0-
0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,3.5-4,>4] in 2014Q1; 
2. GDP growth: [<(-2),(-2)-(-1),(-1)-0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,4-5,5-6,>6] 
changed to [<(-3),(-3)-(-2),(-2)-(-1),(-1)-0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,4-5,5-6,>6] 
in 2009Q2. 
B ECB-SPF 
Since 1999 the European Central Bank (ECB) has conducted a quarterly 
survey of expectations for some of the euro-zone key macroeconomic variables. 
The survey is known as the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (ECB-SPF). 
The horizon structure of ECB-SPF is more complicated than that of US-SPF and 
contains both fixed-event scheme and fixed-horizon scheme. Considering that the 
horizon structure changes over time, we focus on the following four of them that 
are consistently appeared in the sample:  
1. current calendar year (horizon changes from 3 to 0 from Q1 to Q4),  
2. next calendar year (horizon changes from 7 to 4 from Q1 to Q4),  
3. “rolling horizon” for the month (for HICP inflation) and quarter (for 
GDP growth) one year ahead of the latest available observation at the 
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time of the survey (horizon = 3 for HICP inflation, horizon = 2 for 
GDP growth),  
4. “rolling horizon” for the month (for HICP inflation) and quarter (for 
GDP growth) two year ahead of the latest available observation at the 
time of the survey (horizon = 7 for HICP inflation, horizon = 6 for 
GDP growth). 
The “rolling horizon” scheme, which is also a fixed-horizon scheme, is a 
little tricky in this survey. The horizons are set 1- and 2- years ahead of the period 
(month or quarter) for which the latest official release of the underlying indicators 
is available, and therefore could not be simply identified as 4 or 8 but differ across 
indicators. 
As for the details of the range specification for the density forecasts, ECB-
SPF has a very flexible adjustment scheme. The range for density forecasts 
changes over time while the width of the interior intervals remains constant at 0.5 
percent for both output growth and inflation.  
1. Inflation: 
a. From 1999Q1: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,>3.5] 
b. From 2000Q4: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
c. From 2001Q1: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,>3.5] 
d. From 2008Q3: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
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e. From 2009Q2: [<(-2),(-2)-(-1.5),(-1.5)-(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-
0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,>3.5] 
f. From 2010Q1: [<(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-0,0-0.5,0.5-1, 1-1.5,1.5-
2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,>3.5] 
2. GDP growth: 
a. From 1999Q1: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
b. From 2000Q2: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,4-4.5,4.5-5,>5] 
c. From 2001Q1: [<0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
d. From 2008Q4: [<(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-
2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
e. From 2009Q2: [<(-6),(-6)-(-5.5),(-5.5)-(-5),(-5)-(-4.5),(-4.5)-(-
4),(-4)-(-3.5),(-3.5)-(-3),(-3)-(-2.5),(-2.5)-(-2),(-2)-(-1.5),(-1.5)-
(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-
3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
f. From 2010Q1: [<(-1),(-1)-(-0.5),(-0.5)-0,0-0.5,0.5-1,1-1.5,1.5-
2,2-2.5,2.5-3,3-3.5,3.5-4,>4] 
C  SEF 
Initiated by the Bank of England, the first appearance of the Survey of 
External Forecasters (SEF) was in February 1993 where the Inflation Report 
included information on the point forecasts of inflation made by outside 
forecasters. From February 1996, in addition to the central projections for 
inflation, the forecasters were also asked about the probabilities they attached to 
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various possible inflation outcomes. In line with the definition of official inflation 
target, inflation in the survey was first defined as the Retail Prices excluding 
mortgage interest payments (RPIX), and switched to the Consumer Prices Index 
(CPI) from the 2004Q1 survey, following the change in the Bank's official target 
measure in December 2003. As for GDP growth, the point and density forecasts 
have appeared since 1998Q1. There is a break in the horizon structure of SEF 
2006Q2. Before 2006Q2, it asked the forecasters about their predictions at three 
future points in time (combining fixed-event (1,2) and fixed-horizon (3) schemes): 
1. the fourth quarter of the current year (horizon changes from 3 to 0 
from Q1 to Q4); 
2. the fourth quarter of the following year (horizon changes from 7 to 4 
from Q1 to Q4); 
3. the corresponding quarter two years ahead (horizon = 8). 
Since 2006Q2, the survey changed to pure fixed-horizon scheme: 
1. the corresponding quarter one year ahead (horizon = 4); 
2. the corresponding quarter two years ahead (horizon = 8); 
3. the corresponding quarter three years ahead (horizon = 12). 
Similar to the other two datasets, the survey design of density forecasts, in 
terms of the number of bins, the upper and lower bound, and the width of the 
intervals, is evolving over time. The difference is that change in SEF survey is 
more unexpected. In the early (pre-crisis) period, the modifications in the survey 
design are not relevant to fluctuations of underlying variables while the 
adjustments in the crisis period are mostly made in response to the changing of the 
economic environment. 
1. Inflation: 
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a. From 1996Q2: [<1,1-2.5,2.5-4,4-5.5,>5.5] 
b. From 1998Q1: [<1.5,1.5-2.5,2.5-3.5,>3.5] 
c. From 1999Q2: [<1.5,1.5-2,2.5-3,3-3.5,>3.5] 
d. From 2004Q1: [<1,1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,>3] 
e. From 2009Q1: [<0,0-1, 1-1.5,1.5-2,2-2.5,2.5-3,>3] 
2. GDP growth: 
a. From 1998Q1: [<0,0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,>4] 
b. From 2004Q1: [<1,1-2,2-3,>3] 
c. From 2008Q4: [<0,0-1,1-2,2-3,>3] 
d. From 2009Q1: [<(-1),(-1)-0,0-1,1-2,2-3,>3] 
Matching 
To remove the outliers in the density forecasts that are quite unreasonable 
and hard to justify, we continue to apply the matching procedure to refine our 
sample in this chapter. The matching method we use is based on the bounds 
implied by the density forecasts (Engelberg, Manski and Williams, 2009). The 
first step to construct the matched sample is to calculate the lower and upper 
bounds of both subjective median and mean. The interval where the median lies in 
can be obtained from the probabilistic responses directly. To calculate lower and 
upper bounds of the subjective mean, we assume that each bin’s probability mass 
is placed at the bin’s lower and upper endpoint respectively. The results are then 
generated by averaging the lower and upper endpoints weighted by the 
probabilities. If the point forecast is located within any of the two sets of bounds, 
the density forecast is counted as ‘matched’ to the point forecast. The matching 
takes care of another issue in the sample, that is the presence of outliers and 
 90 
unusual observations that appear to be errors of some sort, or at least are difficult 
to otherwise justify. These outliers are also removed via the matching process. 
4.2.2 Z-statistics 
The measure of z-statistics is constructed following the method of 
Probability Integral Transform (Diebold, Gunther and Tay, 1998). Suppose the 
true data generating process is 𝑓,(𝑦,) and the sequence of density forecasts is 𝑝,(𝑦,), the probability integral transform, 𝑧, is defined as the cumulative density 
function corresponding to the density of 𝑝, 𝑦,  evaluated at the realization of data 𝑦,. 
𝑧, = 𝑝, 𝑢 𝑑𝑢567∞ = 𝑃,(𝑦,) 
 If the sequence of density forecasts {𝑝, 𝑦,) ,9:%  coincides with the data {𝑓, 𝑦, 𝛺, ,9:% , then the sequence of probability integral transforms of 𝑦, ,9:%  with 
respect to {𝑝, 𝑦,) ,9:%  is 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑈(0,1). That is, 𝑧, ,9:% 𝑖𝑖𝑑~ 𝑈(0,1) 
 In this chapter, we are not testing the i.i.d. property of z-statistic though 
the tests of i.i.d U(0,1) are readily available. Instead, we are focusing on the more 
informative outputs, the shape of distribution of z-statistic, and analyze what the 
different patterns of the distributions can deliver. We categorize all patterns into 
different groups according to two criteria: Confidence (certain/uncertain) and Bias 
(optimistic/pessimistic). Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the four patterns. 
Confidence 
 When the shape of z-statistic is like a bell, it means the density forecasts 
may be too wide that most of z-statistics are valued at the central part of 0-100, 
indicating that forecasters are too uncertain and less confident in their predictions. 
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On the contrary, when the measures are more concentrated in the two tails, the 
respondents may become too confident in their expectations and thus the density 
forecasts have much smaller spread. 
Bias 
 The distributions of z-statistic sometimes could be quite asymmetric with 
the shape being either left or right skewed. When the shape is left-skewed, there is 
an upward bias, indicating that forecasters may be too optimistic. On the other 
hand, a right-skewed distribution of z-statistic suggests that the forecasters may be 
too pessimistic and the forecasts are downward biased. In the next section, we will 
focus on the shape of z-statistic and examine how it evolves over time. 
4.2.3 Current Progress 
A  SPF 
Inflation 
Confidence: Figure 4.2 depicts distributions of z-statistics for inflation 
density forecasts in US-SPF, with different columns illustrating different periods. 
The five columns from left to right indicate the following periods: 1992-2007 (full 
sample), 1992-2008 (before crisis), 2009 (during the crisis), 2010-2013 (after 
crisis and before the survey change), 2014-2017 (after the survey change). Since 
there is more information available at short horizon, we expect the forecasters to 
be more confident as target period gets closer. However, Figure 4.2 shows that it 
is not the case. Z-statistics are more evenly distributed in the long horizon but 
become concentrated in the central areas at short horizons. This indicates that 
though we do observe the shrink of the spread of density forecasts, the speed of 
shrinking is not enough compared to the information availability. In addition, 
forecasters are generally more uncertain after crisis. As for the survey change in 
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2014Q1 that is neutral to economic environmental, there is no significant change 
in distributions of z-statistic in short horizon. This again shows a controversial 
relationship between the measure of forecaster uncertainty and the confidence 
level revealed by the distribution of z-statistic: the reduction in forecasters 
uncertainty is not necessarily linked to the higher confident level or more evenly 
distributed z-statistic. 
Bias: A sudden drop in the inflation is always linked to an upward bias in 
forecasts. We observe evident left-skewed shape of z-statistics in 2009 for current-
year forecasts (short horizon) and in 2014 for following-year forecasts (long 
horizon), where there is a sudden drop in inflation in 2009 and 2015 respectively. 
GDP 
Figure 4.3 depicts distributions of z-statistics for output density forecasts 
in US-SPF. The different columns from left to right indicate different sample 
periods. The rows from top to bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different 
horizons. During crisis, there exists upward bias in current-year forecasts 
(indicating the sudden depression is unexpected) and downward bias in following-
year forecasts when the economy recovers, indicating the recovery process is 
more prompt than what forecasters expected. 
After crisis, forecasters generally become more uncertain. 
Almost all the biases are observed after a sudden change in the underlying 
economic indicators, suggesting the hysteresis in forecasters’ response. This 
finding supports the idea of learning in expectation formations process. 
B ECB-SPF 
Figure 4.4 depicts distributions of z-statistics for inflation density forecasts 
in ECB-SPF. The different columns from left to right indicate different sample 
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periods. The rows from top to bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different 
horizons. The shapes of z-statistics distribution of ECB-SPF shows that many of 
the measures are valued around either 0 or 100, resulting in spikes at the two tails 
of the distribution. It seems to suggest the “too certain in confidence” pattern as 
shown in Figure 4.1, however when we looked at the heat map of z-statistics 
which depicts all the survey series, we find that it’s not the case. Figure 4.5 shows 
heat map of z-statistics of all the survey series for inflation density forecasts in 
ECB-SPF. The rows from top to bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to 
different horizons. In each figure, the horizontal line indicates different survey 
dates and vertical line shows the corresponding range or bin of z-statistics. The 
darkness of each bin shows to what extent the z-statistics are clustered in it. The 
reason for the clustering in the two tails is that the real indicators changes so 
drastically that forecasters’ adjustment fails to catch up with these sudden changes. 
This hysteresis is widely observed in the datasets, especially during the post-crisis 
period in Europe when the economy exhibits great volatility. Figure 4.6 and 
Figure 4.7 give quite similar patterns in output forecasts to those in inflation 
expectations. 
C  SEF 
 Not surprisingly, the hysteresis is also observed in z-statistics of SEF for 
both GDP growth and inflation forecasts. The sudden increase or decrease in 
underlying variables is always followed with z-statistics stacked in the right (100) 
or left (0) tails of the distributions. However, as we noted before, SEF is different 
in the survey design compared to US- and ECB-SPF. It changed the specification 
of the survey questions many times and some of the changes are neutral to the 
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economic changes. This allows us to further examine whether forecasters’ 
behavior can be improved by or restricted to the survey design.  
Inflation 
 Two changes in inflation survey design are neutral to the economy:  
a. At 1998Q1: from [<1,1-2.5,2.5-4,4-5.5,>5.5] to [<1.5,1.5-2.5,2.5-
3.5,>3.5] 
b. At 1999Q2:  from [<1.5,1.5-2.5,2.5-3.5,>3.5] to [<1.5,1.5-2,2.5-3,3-
3.5,>3.5] 
Figure 4.8 depicts distributions of z-statistics for inflation density forecasts 
in SEF and Figure 4.9 shows heat map of z-statistics of all the survey series for 
inflation density forecasts in SEF. In both cases of survey change listed above, the 
z-statistic indicates better performance of density forecasts in terms of more even 
distribution and reasonable confidence level. 
GDP 
At 2004Q1, the specification for the survey question of GDP growth 
changed from [<0,0-1,1-2,2-3, ,3-4,>4] to [<1,1-2,2-3,>3]. This change is not 
relevant to the real economy, and contrariwise, the economy became even more 
volatile during that period. Figure 4.10 depicts distributions of z-statistics for 
output density forecasts in SEF and Figure 4.11 shows heat map of z-statistics of 
all the survey series for output density forecasts in SEF. As a result of the survey 
change in 2004Q1, the bounds are too tight that we observe many z-statistics 
stacked in the two ends of the range [0-100]. After crisis and several changes in 
survey design, the final setting is [-1,3] and more reasonable than [1,3], with z-
statistic behaving better than pre-crisis period. 
4.2.4 Future Plan 
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The design of the survey matters. When the interior bounds are too close to 
the predicted economic variables or even fail to include the underlying indicator, 
the density forecasts will be less informative due to the limitation of the 
specification of the questions. To better capture the true belief of the forecasters, a 
more flexible survey scheme is necessary to allow the economic experts to express 
precisely what is in their mind. Especially, the analysis in SEF shows that while 
proper refinement of the interval numbers and smaller interval width may help 
improve the performance of density forecasts (Inflation, 1998Q1, 1999Q2), 
improper shrinkage of the range or number of intervals may limit the information 
that density forecasts could deliver (GDP, 2004Q1). 
The hysteresis in z-statistic supports the idea of learning in expectation 
formation process. Survey designer adjusts the question settings only after 
observing a sudden change in the economy. When survey respondents fail to catch 
up with the swift change in the macroeconomic indicators, the z-statistics would 
cluster in the tails of the distributions. 
Lagged adjustment in periods with severe volatility also explains the 
controversial relationship between the measure of forecaster uncertainty and the z-
statistic distributions observed in our sample. When forecaster uncertainty 
decreases as more inflation is available in short horizon or due to refinement in the 
survey design, we expect more evenly distributed z-statistics. However, the shape 
of z-statistics is much more complex and closely related to the variation of the real 
indicators. 
This study provides a new application of the traditional density forecast 
evaluation method and adds to the literature an innovative prospective on 
analyzing the determinants of key features of density forecasts. My future plan is 
 96 
to extend the analysis to include more controls so that I can identify the effect of 
survey design from real economic factors on forecast performance. In addition, a 
deeper investigation of the link between z-statistics and other key features of 
density forecasts including dispersion and forecaster uncertainty may be of great 
help to explain the certain patterns observed in the surveys. 
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Figure 4.1 Patterns of Distributions of Z-statistic 
An overview of the four patterns revealed by the distributions of Z-statistic. The 
top two relate to the criterion of confidence level and bottom two relate to the bias. 
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Figure 4.2 Z-statistic of US-SPF: Inflation, By Period 
Distributions of z-statistics for inflation density forecasts in US-SPF, with 
different columns illustrating different periods. The five columns from left to right 
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indicate the following periods: 1992-2007 (full sample), 1992-2008 (before crisis), 
2009 (during the crisis), 2010-2013 (after crisis and before the survey change), 
2014-2017 (after the survey change). 
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Figure 4.3 Z-statistic of US-SPF: GDP, By Period 
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Distributions of z-statistics for output density forecasts in US-SPF. The different 
columns from left to right indicate different sample periods. The rows from top to 
bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different horizons.  
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Figure 4.4 Z-statistic of ECB-SPF: Inflation, Fixed Horizon, By Period 
Distributions of z-statistics for inflation density forecasts in ECB-SPF. The 
different columns from left to right indicate different sample periods. The rows 
from top to bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different horizons. 
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Figure 4.5 Z-statistic of ECB-SPF: Inflation, Fixed Horizon, All Survey Dates 
Heat map of z-statistics of all the survey series for inflation density forecasts in 
ECB-SPF. The rows from top to bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to 
different horizons. In each figure, the horizontal line indicates different survey 
dates and vertical line shows the corresponding range or bin of z-statistics. The 
darkness of each bin shows to what extent the z-statistics are clustered in it. 
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Figure 4.6 Z-statistic of ECB-SPF: GDP, Fixed Horizon, By Period 
Distributions of z-statistics for output density forecasts in ECB-SPF. The different 
columns from left to right indicate different sample periods. The rows from top to 
bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different horizons. 
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Figure 4.7 Z-statistic of ECB-SPF: GDP, Fixed Horizon, All Survey Dates 
Heat map of z-statistics of all the survey series for output density forecasts in 
ECB-SPF. The rows from top to bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to 
different horizons. In each figure, the horizontal line indicates different survey 
dates and vertical line shows the corresponding range or bin of z-statistics. The 
darkness of each bin shows to what extent the z-statistics are clustered in it. 
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Figure 4.8 Z-statistic of SEF: Inflation, Fixed Event, By Period 
 107 
Distributions of z-statistics for inflation density forecasts in SEF. The different 
columns from left to right indicate different sample periods. The rows from top to 
bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different horizons. 
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Figure 4.9 Z-statistic of SEF: Inflation, Fixed Event, All Survey Dates 
Heat map of z-statistics of all the survey series for inflation density forecasts in 
SEF. The rows from top to bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different 
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horizons. In each figure, the horizontal line indicates different survey dates and 
vertical line shows the corresponding range or bin of z-statistics. The darkness of 
each bin shows to what extent the z-statistics are clustered in it. 
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Figure 4.10 Z-statistic of SEF: GDP, Fixed Event, By Period 
 111 
Distributions of z-statistics for output density forecasts in SEF. The different 
columns from left to right indicate different sample periods. The rows from top to 
bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different horizons. 
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Figure 4.11 Z-statistic of SEF: GDP, Fixed Event, All Survey Dates 
Heat map of z-statistics of all the survey series for output density forecasts in SEF. 
The rows from top to bottom indicate the z-statistics relating to different horizons. 
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In each figure, the horizontal line indicates different survey dates and vertical line 
shows the corresponding range or bin of z-statistics. The darkness of each bin 
shows to what extent the z-statistics are clustered in it. 
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